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Over time, the Dominican Republic formalized a more restrictive definition of 
citizenship by birth.  By expanding the interpretation of what it means to be “in transit,” 
the Dominican Republic began to chip away at its jus soli (right of soil) regime.  Given 
the long history of migration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic and demographic 
realities, this shift has had a disproportionate impact on individuals of Haitian descent.   
The redefinition of the jus soli basis for citizenship reached its peak in the now infamous 
sentence of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic, 168-13.  In 
September 2013, the Constitutional Tribunal issued Sentence 168-13, which retroactively 
denationalized and effectively rendered stateless many Dominicans of Haitian descent by 
establishing that children born in the Dominican Republic to those illegally residing in 
the country were not entitled to citizenship by birth, as their parents were considered to 
be “in transit.”  The Sentence further called for a national regularization plan.   
In an effort to implement Sentence 168-13, the Dominican government 
established the National Plan for the Regularization of Foreigners (PNRE).  The PNRE is 
a plan to regularize the status of undocumented migrants in the Dominican Republic, 
which most notably impacts Haitian migrants.  To be clear the PNRE provides a pathway 
to regularization for undocumented migrants, it does not provide an adequate avenue for 
those Dominican nationals rendered stateless by Sentence 168-13.  Following 
international backlash over Sentence 168-13, Dominican Republic President Danilo 
Medina issued Law 169-14 (Naturalization Law), which provides a pathway to 
naturalization for those effectively left stateless by the Sentence.   
As will be detailed in this Report, although attempts to regularize undocumented 
migrants and remedy the fallout from Sentence 168-13 for Dominican nationals are 
commendable, the implementation of the PNRE and the Naturalization Law was 
problematic in many respects.  Both the PNRE and the Naturalization Law suffered from 
insufficient capacity, inadequate timeframes, and poor publicity, amongst other factors. 
This Report will also detail how various actors were involved in or impacted by 
the regularization and naturalization processes, including intergovernmental 
organizations, the private sector, civil society, as well as several important bilateral 
relationships with the Dominican Republic.  Moreover, this Report will discuss the role 
that these actors could play moving forward.  
Undoubtedly, states have the sovereign right to determine the criteria for 
citizenship, but they must do so consistently with international human rights law, 
including, inter alia, the right to nationality and prohibitions on racial discrimination.  
This Report will discuss the Dominican Republic’s responsibilities under international 
human rights law.   
Finally, this Report will outline the constraints that may inhibit the work of policy 
makers and human rights defenders in addressing immigration and citizenship issues.  
The plight of Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican 
Republic is complicated by a history of anti-Haitianism, an unfavorable domestic 
political climate, and a nascent human rights culture.   
 





With the deadline to apply under the Naturalization Law expired and the deadline 
for the PNRE quickly approaching, the fate of Haitian migrants and Dominicans of 
Haitian descent still remains uncertain.  Along with the PNRE deadline comes the 
expiration of the moratorium on deportations.  As such, there is concern about Haitian 
migrants being deported and Dominicans of Haitian descent being expulsed without 
adequate due process.  Consequently, the situation on the ground merits close monitoring 








This Report is the product of an academic yearlong experiential learning course 
on international human rights at Johns Hopkins University – The Paul H. Nitze School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS).  The research team consisted of ten graduate 
student researchers and one professorial lecturer.     
During the Fall 2014 semester, the research team began by broadly studying the 
human rights situation of Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the 
Dominican Republic.  Through the course of study, including reviewing some of the 
existing literature, hearing from guest speakers, attending events on the issue, and class 
discussion, the research topic was refined to examining the protection and promotion of 
the rights of Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican 
Republic with regards to access to documentation and regularization of status.  The 
research team developed a questionnaire to help frame their understanding of how 
different actors were working to protect and promote the aforementioned rights.  In 
addition to background research, the research team identified relevant experts and 
stakeholders to contact for meetings and interviews. 
Following the initial background research, a majority of the research team visited 
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic to conduct a five-day fact-finding mission in 
January 2015. 1  The team conducted interviews with a number of organizations and 
individuals while there, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
Embassy of the United States in Santo Domingo, Embassy of Haiti in Santo Domingo, 
Office of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Dominican Republic, La 
Unidad de Derechos Humanos de la Procuraduría General de la República Dominicana, 
Mesa Nacional para las Migraciones y Refugiados en República Dominicana 
(MENAMIRD), El Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitiana (MUDHA), Movimiento 
Social-Cultural de los Trabajadores Haitianos (MOSCTHA), Centro Bonó, Batey Relief 
Alliance, Observatorio de Migrantes del Caribe (OBMICA), as well as Ambassador 
Alberto E. Despradel, and Lic. Eduardo Jorge Prats. 
Upon returning to Washington, DC, the team analyzed the information collected 
during the fact-finding mission, and continued to conduct research, including follow-up 
research and additional interviews. 
The research team drafted this Report over the course of the Spring 2015 
semester.  The team met weekly to further analyze issues, strategize, and to discuss the 
logistics of the Report.   
On May 12, 2015, the research team publicly presented their report findings at an 
event held at Johns Hopkins University – SAIS.  
This study received approval for human subjects research from the Johns Hopkins 
University Homewood Institutional Review Board (HIRB). Oral consent was obtained 
from our interview partners.  When permitted, the research team uses the interviewees’ 
names and/or affiliations in this report. 
  
                                                 
1 A subset of the research team also visited Haiti, where they had an opportunity to visit with a 






Indicators2 Dominican Republic Haiti 
GDP per Capita 5,879 819.9 
GDP Total (billions) 61.164 8.459  
GDP Growth (annual %) 4.6 (2010-2013 average 
=4.625) 
4.3 (2010-2013 average 
=1.8) 
Population  10,403,761 10,317,461 
Population Growth  1.2 1.4 
Net Migration  -140,000 -175,001 
Ethnic Groups*3 mixed 73%, white 16%, 
black 11% 
 
black 95%, mixed and 
white 5% 
 
Official Language(s)* Spanish French, Haitian Creole  
Government Type* Democratic republic Republic 
Gini Coefficent* 45.7 (2012) 59.2 
Migrant population by 
country of origin  - (% of 
total immigrant pop.) *4 
Haiti (65%), Venezuela 
(5%), United States (3.3%) 
Dominican Republic and 
Venezuela (13%); U.S, 
Spain and Cuba (8%) 
Sources of GDP (Value 
Added % GDP) 
Agriculture = 6.3 
Industry =26.9 
Services =66.7 
Agriculture = unknown 
Industry = unknown 
Services = unknown 
Urban Population 8,019,427 5,795,111 
Poverty headcount ratio 
at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of 
population)  
2.3 (2012) 24 
Poverty headcount ratio 
at $2 a day (PPP) (% of 
population) 
8.8 (2012) Not listed 
Poverty headcount ratio 
at national poverty lines 
(% of population) 





stock (% of population) 
4.3 0.4 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the data was taken from The World Bank database, http://data.worldbank.org/.   
3 Unless otherwise noted, starred (*) data was taken from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World 
Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.  
4 Based on Migration Policy Institute (MPI) data, “International Migrant Population by Country of Origin 
and Destination,” MPI, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/international-migrant-
population-country-origin-and-destination. Percentages were calculated by a research team member.  
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Anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic 
 
There is a long history of contentious relations between the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti.  In the period from 1822 through 1844, Haiti occupied the Dominican Republic 
and controlled the island of Hispaniola engendering early anti-Haitianism in the 
Dominican Republic.  Notably, Dominican Independence Day celebrates the day that the 
Dominican Republic gained independence not from Spain but from Haiti.     
Demonstrating the divide and enduring animosity between the countries, 
Dominican President Rafael Trujillo killed between 9,000 and 18,000 ethnic Haitians 
residing in the Dominican Republic in 1937 (commonly referred to as the Parsley 
Massacre).5  Indeed, President Trujillo forged a national identity centered around the 
racial ideals of Dominicans as descended from Spaniards versus Haitians as descended 
from slaves, despite the vast majority of Dominicans having a mixed race heritage.6 What 
followed were decades of anti-Haitian vitriol that continues to inform the Dominican 
conception of national identity. Light skin was and continues to be valued. Throughout 
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s certain civil registry offices started turning away even 
individuals who had valid cédulas de identidad y electoral7 from registering Dominican 
birth certificates, on the basis that they were “Haitian” or simply “looked like a Haitian.”8 
Historical racial tensions have become more institutionalized in recent years.  In 
2010, the Dominican Republic ratified a new Constitution.  It is the first constitution in 
Dominican history to mention human rights.  Although this constitutional recognition of 
human rights is commendable, the new Constitution also redefined citizenship in a more 
restrictive manner.  As the largest migrant population, the new citizenship definition 
disproportionately affects Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian migrants.  
From 1929 until January 26, 2010, the Dominican Constitution granted 
citizenship to all those born within its territory except for diplomats and those born “in-
transit.” During this time, long-standing legal authority interpreted “in-transit” to be 
individuals who were in the Dominican Republic for less than ten days.9 As long as 
parents were in the country more than ten days at the time of birth, any child born on 
Dominican soil was conferred Dominican citizenship, regardless of the parent’s 
residential status in the Dominican Republic. However with the 2010 Constitution, only 
                                                 
5 Wilhelmina Agyapong, "Troubled Haitian-Dominican Bilateral Relations Await Progress," Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs (February 27, 2014), accessed February 24, 2015, http://www.coha.org/troubled-
haitian-dominican-bilateral-relations-await-progress/. 
6 Maja Horn, “Dictates of Dominican Democracy: Conceptualizing Caribbean Political Modernity,” Small 
Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism 18 (2) (2014): 30.  
7 This is the national form of identification that is needed to receive a variety of services from education to 
medical care, and a valid cédula is required to register the birth of one’s child. Possession is mandatory and 
to be caught without a cédula risks fines, imprisonment and even deportation. Open Society Justice 
Initiative, "Dominicans of Haitian Descent and the Compromised Right to Nationality. Report Presented to 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Occasion of its 140th Session,” (October 2010): 4, 
accessed February 10, 2015, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Dominican-
Republic-Nationality-Report-ENG-20110805.pdf. 
8 Ibid., 5. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
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children of “legal residents” born on Dominican soil are granted citizenship.10 Any child 
born in the Dominican Republic after January 26th 2010, whose parents did not hold 
either Dominican citizenship or legal residency, was not considered a citizen by birth.  
Furthermore, in 2013, the Constitutional Tribunal declared in 168-13 that the “in-
transit” definition could be applied retroactively to any Dominicans of Haitian descent 
born since 1929.11 The new “in transit” definition meant that Dominicans of Haitian 
descent like Juliana Dequis Pierre [hereinafter: Ms. Dequis], 12 the plaintiff in 168-13, 
who had Dominican citizenship and a Dominican birth certificate, had both revoked.  The 
Tribunal decided that because her parents were undocumented migrant workers both her 
and her parent’s status was “irregular,” and thus she was not entitled to Dominican 
citizenship.    
Ms. Dequis’ case came to international attention in 2013 after her request for a 
national identification card was denied by officials based on the idea that she could not be 
Dominican because her last name sounded Haitian.13 As mentioned above, the 
Constitutional Tribunal eventually ruled that despite being born in the Dominican 
Republic and being registered at birth as Dominican, Dequis was not entitled to 
Dominican citizenship.14 The Tribunal decided that her parents, migrant workers from 
Haiti, did not have the correct documentation when Dequis was born. Therefore, Dequis, 
and her parents are both considered “in transit” and are not entitled to Dominican 
citizenship. In addition to denationalizing a person who had no other citizenship, the 
Constitutional Tribunal, then ordered the Central Electoral Board (Junta Central 
Electoral “JCE”)15 to review all births since 1929 and remove from the registry any 
individuals who were “wrongfully” registered as Dominican citizens. 16 Thus, the 
Dominican Republic has systematically diluted the rights of Dominicans of Haitian 
descent and Haitian migrants within the country with the passing and implementation of 
the new definition of citizenship in the 2010 Constitution and Law 168-13. 
Following Sentence 168-13, Presidential Decree 327-13 (PNRE) was issued to 
provide a pathway towards regularization for undocumented migrants in the Dominican 
Republic. Vocal international outcry against the Dominican Republic led to Law 169-14 
(Naturalization Law), which created a pathway towards citizenship for those rendered 
                                                 
10 Liliana Gamboa and Julia Harrington Reddy, “Judicial Denationalisation of Dominicans of Haitian 
Descent,” Forced Migration Review 46 (May 2014): 52-53, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://www.fmreview.org/en/afghanistan/gamboa-harrington.pdf.  
11 Ibid., 53. 
12 Some sources spell Juliana’s last name as Deguis. This report will use Dequis. 
13 Santiago A. Canton and Wade H. McMullen, Jr., "The Dominican Republic and Haiti: Shame," Americas 
Quarterly Higher Education and Competitiveness (Summer 2014), accessed April 20, 2015, 
http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/dominican-republic-and-haiti-shame.  
14 This became known as the ruling (TC/0168/13).  Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic, 
Sentencia TC/0168/13, Public Law TC/0168/13, (September 23, 2013), available at 
http://tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/sites/default/files/documentos/Sentencia%20TC%200168-13%20-
%20C.pdf. [hereinafter: Sentencia TC/0168/13].    
15 While the Dominican Constitution defines who has the right to Dominican nationality, official 
recognition and proof of such nationality is granted by the state civil registry agency, today regulated by the 
Junta Central Electoral “JCE.” The JCE is the organization that issues birth certificates and national 
identity cards (cédulas de identidad y electoral). Open Society Justice Initiative, “Compromised Right to 
Nationality,” 3. 
16 Gamboa and Reddy, “Judicial Denationalisation of Dominicans of Haitian Descent,” 53. 
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stateless by Sentence 168-13, most notably Dominicans of Haitian descent.  Law 169-14 
recognizes the citizenship rights of those individuals born between 1929 and 2007 who 
were properly registered at birth.17 In addition this law establishes a route to citizenship 
for those Dominicans of Haitian descent that were born between these years but lack 
proper documentation.18 Unfortunately, these laws were not effectively implemented, as 
will be discussed further below. 
Migration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic 
 
 Between 1916 and 1970, initial migration flows from Haiti to the Dominican 
Republic were a result of agroindustry requirements. Under the 1960’s bilateral trade 
agreements between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 15,000-20,000 Haitian migrants 
would come to the Dominican Republic each year. 19According to former Dominican 
Ambassador to Haiti, Alberto E. Despradel, Haiti did not have the land needed to 
establish sugar plantations. This migratory movement displaced Dominicans from 
agriculture to service industries, which contributed to mounting xenophobia.20  
Since the 1970s migration from Haiti has increased dramatically.21  Whereas 
initial migration flows were a result of agroindustry requirements, migration outflows 
from Haiti are now mostly influenced by political instability, devastation from natural 
disasters, poor wages and lack of opportunity within Haiti. Those who can, leave for what 
they hope is a better life abroad. However, despite the problems faced by Haitian 
migrants abroad, Haiti continues to have a negative net migration rate.22  In the 
Dominican Republic alone, estimates range between 650,000 and one million Haitians 
living in the Dominican Republic.23  
During the 1960s, the Dominican government, in an effort to stop Haitian 
immigrant influence on Dominican culture, proposed the creation of company owned 
towns on the outskirts of sugarcane plantations called bateyes.24 Haitian sugarcane 
workers were confined to these work camps, often times with no running water, no 
electricity, no bathrooms, no schools and no medical facilities. “The Haitians were not 
allowed to leave the bateyes, under the threat of deportation, except to work in the 
fields.”25 Conditions in the bateyes changed during the mid-1990s as non-governmental 
                                                 
17 Monique A. Hannam, "Soy Dominicano -- The Status of Haitian Descendants Born in the Dominican 
Republic and Measures to Protect Their Right to a Nationality,” Notes, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 47, no. 4 (August 2014): 1151, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/Hannam-Final.pdf. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Joseph Cherubin, MOSCTHA, interview by Johns Hopkins University-SAIS International Human Rights 
Clinic, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 19, 2015.  
20 Ambassador Alberto E. Despradel, interview by Johns Hopkins University-SAIS International Human 
Rights Clinic, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 21, 2015.   
21 Steeve Coupeau, The History of Haiti. Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations, (Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood Press, 2008), 149. 
22 See Graph 1; in 2012 net migration was -175,001 for Haiti.  
23 Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - 
Dominican Republic : Haitians,” (2008), accessed April 21, 2015, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d2e21.html.  
24 Pam Wright, "The Origin of the Dominican Batey," Children of the Nations, November 14, 2007, 




organizations (NGOs) and the international community took notice of how people on the 
bateyes were treated.26 
The privatization of the sugarcane industry in 1998 and the subsequent closing of 
many plantations forced Haitian migrants out of the bateyes into the cities to find work.27  
The changing labor structure has exacerbated and created new tension between Haitians 
and Dominicans as they took jobs previously occupied by Dominicans.28 Today Haitian 
migrants work not only in agriculture but also in other sectors such as construction, 
domestic service and tourism.29 Moreover, because of the complexity of the new 
regularization and naturalization laws, Haitian immigrants are unsure of what these new 
laws mean for them. According to El Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitiana 
(MUDHA), a NGO in the Dominican Republic that works on health, education and 
human rights issues, immigration is in fact increasing because migrants believe they can 
now enter.30 Indeed, in November 2014, two hundred undocumented Haitian workers 
were arrested after illegally crossing the border in the mistaken belief that they would 
now qualify for the PNRE.31 However, the regularization plan only applies to those living 
“illegally” in the country before the Constitutional Tribunal passed Sentence 168-13.32 
As mentioned, political instability is a major factor in Haitian migration outflows. 
From 1957-1986, Haitians endured twenty-nine years of dictatorship. Throughout the 
1990s and 2000s military coups and political upheaval wracked Haitian society. Internal 
upheaval came to a head in February 2004 when the United Nations deployed a 
stabilization mission to Haiti.33  Instability within the country was deemed a threat to 
international peace and security and the Haitian government was deemed incapable of 
instituting democratic order.34 Haiti currently ranks 9th on the Fund for Peace’s 2014 
Fragile States Index which looks at factors such as poverty, human flight, uneven 
development, group grievance, human rights and legitimacy of the state.35 Corruption 
also contributes to instability within Haiti. In 2014 Haiti was ranked 161 out of 175 
countries on Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index.36  In November 
of last year, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets of Port-au-Prince calling for 
President Martelly’s resignation due to his failure to hold promised elections, hand-
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 William Charpantier, MENAMIRD, interview by Johns Hopkins University-SAIS International Human 
Rights Clinic, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 22, 2015. 
29 Cherubin, interview. 
30 Liliana Dolis, MUDHA, interview by Johns Hopkins University-SAIS International Human Rights 
Clinic, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 19, 2015. 
31 "Haiti - Social: Arrest of 200 Haitians in the Dominican Republic," Haiti Libre, November 19, 2014, 
accessed May 15, 2015, http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-12542-haiti-social-arrest-of-200-haitians-in-
the-dominican-republic.html. 
32 Ibid. 
33 United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). 
34 Coupeau, History of Haiti, 145. 
35 The Failed State Index was renamed in 2014 to the Fragile State Index to better encourage discussions 
that support an increase in human security and improved livelihoods.  Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, 
Fund for Peace (2014), http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/.    




picking representatives, and wide-scale corruption throughout the government.37 Since 
January 2015, most members of Parliament’s terms have expired without renewal, 
leaving President Martelly to rule the country by decree with an interim Government.38  





Economic weakness and weak governmental institutions contributed to the 
devastation of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Systemic poverty, a fragile government and a 
poor infrastructure limited the capacity of local actors to respond to the crisis.40 A 
government that was already incapacitated became virtually nonfunctioning in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake.41 The very actors who would normally manage 
the response were themselves victims. In the end, 220,000 people were killed, 300,000 
were injured and two million individuals were left homeless.42  The humanitarian and 
economic costs were incredibly high and further contributed to the instability within 
Haiti. Pursuant to Graph 1, Haiti experienced a significant decrease to net migration in 
2010, dropping from -2.07 in 2009 to -9.75. The United States is the largest recipient of 
                                                 
37 Thomas Péralte, "Haiti: Largest Anti-Government Demonstration to Date Demands President Michel 
Martelly's Resignation," Global Research, November 17, 2014, accessed April 20, 2015, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/haiti-largest-anti-government-demonstration-to-date-demands-president-
michel-martellys-resignation/5416581.  
38 The World Bank, “Country Overview- Haiti,” (2015), retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview.  
39 This graph was created using data published by Mundi, “index mundi,” retrieved from 
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=ha&v=27.  
40 Jonathan Patrick, "Haiti Earthquake Response Emerging Evaluation Lessons," OECD Evaluation 



























Graph 1: Haitian Net Migration rate 
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Haitian migrants accounting for 59% of total migrants; the Dominican Republic is the 





Labor migration is vital to the Haitian economy.  Haiti is one of the poorest 
countries in the world with a gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 of only 8.4 billion 
US dollars. Twenty percent of Haiti’s total GDP comes from personal remittances,44 
which is a direct result of emigration. In a paper commissioned by The World Bank in 
2006, Manuel Orozco estimates between 134,400,000 USD and 218,400,000 USD is sent 
from the Dominican Republic to Haiti, though the actual contribution is unknown.45  In 
addition to remittances, Haiti’s GDP per capita is only about 819 USD, compare this to 
the Dominican Republic’s GDP per capita of 5,879 USD. Fifty-nine percent of the 
population lives on less than 2.44 US dollars per day.46 This is however a slight decrease, 
from 2010 in which, seventy-six percent of the population lived on less than 2 US dollars 
per day.47 Given the conditions in Haiti, Haitian migrants have a great economic 
incentive to immigrate to the Dominican Republic.  
 
                                                 
43 This graph was created using data from The World Bank. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org.  
44 The World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” (2013). Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) 
 [Data file]. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS.  
45 Manuel Orozco, “Understanding the Remittance Economy in Haiti,” (paper commissioned by The World 
Bank, March 15, 2006): 6, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://www.thedialogue.org/publicationfiles/understanding%20the%20remittance%20economy%20in%20h
aiti.pdf.  
46 The World Bank, Country Overview- Haiti (2015). 
47 Amélie Gauthier and Madalena Moita, "Vulnerability and Causes of Fragility in Haiti," Fride Project 




Likewise, Haitian migrants provide economic benefits to the Dominican 
Republic. Haitian migrants account for over 2% of the population in the Dominican 
Republic and are therefore integral to the Dominican economy and labor force.  Haitian 
labor in the Dominican Republic is critical and represents about 5.4% of GDP- this is 
more than 2 billion dollars a year.49 According to The World Bank, agricultural, industry,  
and services sectors make up 99.7% of GDP value added in the Dominican Republic.50 
As the largest migrant group, Haitians impact all sectors of the economy.  According to 
the president of the Dominican Housing Builders and Developers Association, up to 
270,000 undocumented Haitians work in the construction industry and “deportation 
would paralyze the economy.”51  As such, policy makers and society should take notice 
of the benefits of Haitian migrant labor to the Dominican Republic.52  
Political Culture in the Dominican Republic 
 
Since its foundation, the Dominican Republic has struggled with its own political 
and cultural identity. It is only recently that the Dominican Republic has embarked on a 
                                                 
48 This graph was created using data from the World Bank. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org.  
49 Edwin Paraison, Skype interview by Johns Hopkins University-SAIS International Human Rights Clinic, 
Washington, D.C., USA, March 10, 2015.  
50 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2013),  Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), 
Industry, value added (% of GDP), Services, etc., value added (% of GDP), retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.  
51 Ezra Fieser, “Dominican Nurse Fired for Haitian Parents Shows Expulsion Threat,” Bloomberg, March 
24, 2015, accessed March 30, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-24/dominican-
nurse-fired-for-haitian-parents-shows-expulsion-threat.  
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path to political democratization.53 The past three centuries of political turmoil has left an 
indelible mark on the Dominican mindset, with the Dominican Republic perennially 
under the control of foreign nations including Spain, France, Haiti, the United States, and 
a series of authoritarian and unstable governments. From the Dominican Republic’s 
official independence in 1844 to present day, the presidency changed 84 times with only 
19% of those completing at least one term.54  Of particular importance in shaping the 
political and cultural sphere of modern day Dominican society is the legacy left by the 
Trujillo dictatorship. President Trujillo centralized power, killed off opponents, and 
monopolized the economy,55 while retaining the veneer of democracy by holding “free 
elections.”  For several decades, Dominicans participated in a democratic process 
knowing that their voices had no effect in shaping government.56  
Currently, the Dominican Republic is a representative democracy with three 
branches of government, judicial, executive, and legislative, that share political power. 
There are three major political parties, the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), the 
Reformist Social Christian Party (PRSC) and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). 
However, the PLD has acquired political hegemony gaining the presidency and large 
majorities in both parties—31 members of the 32-seat Senate, 105 of the 183-seat 
Chamber of Deputies.57 According to the political risk firm Political Risk Services (PRS), 
the PLD is likely to remain the dominant party in the future due to its popularity and the 
popularity of President Medina as well as a split within the PRD.58  
During the past twenty years, there has been a steady increase in the openness of 
the political process in the Dominican Republic but progress has been limited by a 
national identity and political culture that discriminates against Dominicans of Haitian 
descent and Haitian migrants.  Even President Medina is not immune to the public’s anti-
Haitianism. After the 2013 Constitutional Tribunal Sentence 168-13, which retroactively 
revoked the citizenship of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent and affected 
hundreds of thousands of Haitian migrants, President Medina apologized to those 
affected, promising no one would be denationalized.59 Unfortunately, President Medina 
then retracted the apology citing that rule of law must be respected.60 Though he 
recognized the plight of those effected, President Medina stated, “that the Executive 
Branch cannot meddle in the Constitutional Tribunal ruling and Central Electoral Board 
                                                 
53 Democratization of the political process started with the end of the Trujillo regime, but it is only since 
1996 that international observers believe that the presidential and congressional elections have been 
generally free and fair.  The PRS Group, “Dominican Republic Country Conditions for Investment & 
Trade” in Political Risk Yearbook: Dominican Republic Country Report, The PRS Group, January 1, 2015, 
12, EBSCOhost (AN 100605609). 
54 Ewout Frankema and Aline Masé, “An Island Drifting Apart. Why Haiti is Mired in Poverty While the 
Dominican Republic Forges Ahead,” Journal of International Development 26 (1) (2014): 130. 
55 Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 2001), 14. 
56 Horn, “Dictates of Dominican Democracy,” 23. 
57 The PRS Group, “Dominican Republic Country Forecast” in Political Risk Yearbook: Dominican 
Republic Country Report, The PRS Group, January 1, 2015, 15, EBSCOhost (AN 100605609). 
58 Ibid., 17. 




resolutions.”61 However President Medina and the Dominican government made 
significant progress in trying to address the problem created by Sentence168-13 by 
creating Law 169-14. Unfortunately, political will in implementing both the 
regularization and naturalization laws is limited due to the public mindset and weak rule 
of law. 
Human Rights in the Dominican Republic   
 
The Dominican Republic’s track record on human rights is poor. Corruption is an 
endemic problem within the police, the government, and the private sector. According to 
Amnesty International, allegations of torture and mistreatment by the police continue to 
be reported with little done to bring the perpetrators to justice. Between January and July 
of 2014 the number of killings by the police increased by 13% since 2013 with 87 people 
dead in the first six months of 2014.62 “Fourteen people a month are dying at the hands of 
the police in the Dominican Republic. Many of these killings seem to have been 
unlawful,” said Erika Guevara Rosas, Amnesty International’s Americas Director in 
2014.63  
Just this year Tulile,64 a Haitian migrant, was lynched in Santo Domingo. The 
police concluded it was robbery gone wrong. However Wade McMullen, an attorney with 
the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, and others believe it was a 
racially motivated killing. “For the Dominican authorities to rule out racism as a factor 
less than 24 hours after a man of Haitian descent was hanged in a public space is not just 
irresponsible policing, it is an outrageous example of discrimination endemic to the 
Dominican Republic.”  Indeed, the long record of anti-Haitianism continues to be a 
problem in the Dominican Republic.   
Expressions of anti-Haitianism occur at both an individual and institutional level. 
In speaking with representatives at Mesa Nacional para las Migraciones y Refugiados en 
República Dominicana, (MENAMIRD), a human rights based organization in the 
Dominican Republic, there have been numerous examples. For example, in the month 
preceding the fact-finding trip for this report, documented Haitian workers who were 
returning to the Dominican Republic after a temporary visit to Haiti for Christmas, were 
refused entry into the Dominican Republic despite having legal work documents. In 
another case, the Dominican border town of Neiba was raided with over 22 Haitians and 
Dominicans of Haitian descent illegally deported and their documents torn up by 
soldiers.65  Arbitrary deportations, destruction of documents, and misuse of political 
power constitute gross violation of human rights and run contrary to international human 
                                                 
61 “Medina: I apologized, not asked forgiveness, to offspring of Haitians,” Dominican Today, October 8, 
2013, accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2013/10/8/49219/Medina-I-
apologized-not-asked-forgiveness-to-offspring-of-Haitians.  
62 “Amnesty International Report 2014/15: Dominican Republic,” Amnesty International, accessed March 
7, 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/dominican-republic/report-dominican-republic/.  
63 Amnesty International, “Dominican Republic: Killing at the hands of the police rise while reforms stall, 
press release, Amnesty International, August 15, 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-
releases/2014/08/dominican-republic-killings-hands-police-rise-while-reforms-stall./   
64 There are varying accounts of the man’s true name but most sources agree that he went by the nickname 
Tulie. 
65 Charpantier, interview. 
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rights law and standards of human decency. 
The Human Rights Unit at the Attorney General’s Office of the Dominican 
Republic should address the aforementioned human rights violations.  Unfortunately, the 
Unit is hindered by a number of factors. The Unit does not have the institutional 
knowledge or capacity to be effective on a large scale. Indeed, it is less than three years 
old, and with only six people working at the central office, capacity is low.66 As such, the 
Dominican Republic should provide additional resources and personnel to build the 
necessary capacity. 
Due to their size and role as a governmental office, the Human Rights Unit is 
often disconnected from the very individuals who need their help. Human rights 
organizations are an important partner for the Unit. In the past, they have worked closely 
with Centro Bonó, who would alert the Unit to human rights violations.67 Unfortunately, 
communication hinges on personal connections between groups that may be hard to 
establish. When the Unit’s source at Centro Bonó changed organizations, so did their 
access to that information. As the Unit noted, human rights violations cannot be 
investigated if they are not known.68  Thus, human rights organizations should consider 
reporting suspected abuses to the Human Rights Unit for investigation. 
The Dominican Republic is a country that is struggling with its identity. It has 
instituted a series of legal changes – some of which are positive, such as the inclusion of 
human rights in the 2010 Constitution and the creation of the Human Rights Unit in the 
Attorney General’s Office, whereas others are missteps, such as Sentence 168-13 and its 
fallout. Moreover, human rights abuses are not just happening at a national level but are 
prevalent at a societal level. For true change to happen, Dominican society needs to retire 






Nationality has been observed as “the right to have rights”69 because it invites an 
individual to enjoy various “opportunities and privileges.”70  Consistent with this general 
principle, in the Dominican Republic, nationality is the lynchpin to enjoying many 
                                                 
66 Danissa Cruz and Shyam Fernandez Vidal, La Unidad de Derechos Humanos de la Procuraduría 
General de la República Dominicana, interview by Johns Hopkins University-SAIS International Human 
Rights Clinic, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 22, 2015. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Shaina Aber and Mary Small, “Citizen or Subordinate: Permutations of Belonging in the United States 
and the Dominican Republic,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 1, no. 3 (2013): 77, accessed 
June 2, 2015, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.14240/jmhs.v1i3.12 (citing Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, new edition (New York: Harcourt 1968): 299).   
70 Aber and Small, “Citizen or Subordinate,” 77 (citing J.M. Mancini and Graham Finlay, “Citizenship 
Matters: Lessons from the Irish Citizenship Referendum,” American Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2008); Richard 
Middleton and Sheridan Wigginton, “A Comparative Analysis of How the Framing of the Jus Soli Doctrine 
Affects Immigrant Inclusion into a National Identity,” Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review 21, 
no. 2  (2012); Ayelet Shachar, “The Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World,” Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 8, no. 2 (2007); and Laura Van Waas, “The Children of Irregular Migrants: A Stateless Generation,” 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 25, no. 3 (2007)).   
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political, social, and economic rights. 71  Given this interdependence of human rights, 
rendering a population stateless has severe human consequences in that it leaves 
individuals vulnerable and unable to fully exercise their basic rights.    
Presently, there are two main birthright citizenship regimes – jus sanguinis 
(citizenship by blood) and jus soli (citizenship by soil). 72 Jus soli regimes are most 
notably seen in the Americas. 73  It should be emphasized that some scholars have 
characterized this jus soli practice common in the Americas as taking on the character 
and authority of customary international law, which is binding and “accepted as law.”74  
Nonetheless, as will be discussed, states are limited by international human rights law in 
their construction and application of citizenship regimes.75     
Unsurprisingly, there has been tension between the limits of state sovereignty in 
determining who is a national and international human rights law, which guarantees a 
right to nationality.  Indeed, this tension was expressed during the drafting of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in which concerns regarding the role of 
state sovereignty in nationality law were prevalent.76  More recently, the tension between 
state sovereignty to determine citizenship and the right to nationality is unfolding in the 
Dominican Republic.   
The Dominican Republic and International Law  
 
“Everyone has the right to a nationality.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality . . . .” Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Art. 1577 
 
The right to nationality is established in many international and regional human 
rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),78 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
                                                 
71 Marselha Gonçalves Margerin, Monika Kalra Varma, and Salvador Sarmiento, “Building a Dangerous 
Precedent in the Americas: Revoking Fundamental Rights of Dominicans,” Human Rights Brief 21, no. 1 
(2014): 10, accessed June 2, 2015, 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1894&context=hrbrief.    
72 Aber and Small, “Citizen or Subordinate,” 77. 
73 Hannam, “Soy Dominicano,” 1137. 
74  Ibid., 1137-1138.  
75 As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights observed in Yean and Bosico, “The determination of who 
has a right to be a national continues to fall within a State’s domestic jurisdiction. However, its discretional 
authority in this regard is gradually being restricted with the evolution of international law, in order to 
ensure a better protection of the individual in the face of arbitrary acts of States. Thus, at the current stage 
of the development of international human rights law, this authority of the States is limited, on the one 
hand, by their obligation to provide individuals with the equal and effective protection of the law and, on 
the other hand, by their obligation to prevent, avoid and reduce statelessness.” Case of the Yean and Bosico 
Children v. The Dominican Republic, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), para 140, 
September 8, 2005, accessed June 11, 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/44e497d94.html.    
76 Katelyn A. Horne, “Navigating Nationality: The Rights to Birth Registration and Nationality in Refugee 
magnet States,” Notes, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2014): 121-122. 
77 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948, article 15.   
78 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, article 24(3) (“Every child has the 
right to acquire a nationality.”).   
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Discrimination (CERD),79 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),80 the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD),81 the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrants Workers and Members of their Families (CMW),82 the CRC,83 and the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).84 
The Dominican Republic is a party to most of the aforementioned instruments, 
including the ICCPR, CERD, CEDAW, CRPD, and the CRC.85  Notably, CERD 
provides in Article 5(d)(iii) that with regards to the right to nationality, among other 
rights, “States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its 
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or 
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law . . . .”86 Moreover the Dominican 
Republic is a party to the ACHR, 87 in which Article 20 provides for the right to 
nationality, including that “[e]very person has the right to the nationality of the state in 
whose territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other nationality.”88 As 
such, there is a robust international human rights law framework for the protection of the 
right to nationality in the Dominican Republic.    
Unfortunately, the Dominican Republic has not signed or ratified the CMW, 
which, given the migrant worker population, would have particular resonance in the 
Dominican Republic.  Indeed, Article 29 of the CMW provides that “[e]ach child of a 
migrant worker shall have the right to a name, to registration of birth and to a 
nationality.”89 The Dominican Republic is urged to sign and ratify the CMW to provide 
the utmost in protection to migrant workers and their families.      
In addition, the Dominican Republic is a signatory to the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness.90   Article 1 provides that “[a] Contracting State shall grant 
its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless.”91 As a 
signatory to this convention, pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
                                                 
79 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1965, 
article (5)(d)(iii). 
80 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979, article 9.   
81 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), article 18.   
82 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, or the Migrant Workers Convention (CMW), adopted December 18, 1990 at the 45th session of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, article 29.   
83 CRC, article 7(1). 
84 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 1969, article 20.   
85 The Dominican Republic acceded to the ICCPR on January 4, 1978; acceded to CERD on May 25, 1983; 
ratified CEDAW on September 2, 1982; ratified the CRPD on August 18, 2009; and ratified the CRC on 
June 11, 1991.  Please see the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
website,http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=52&Lang=EN 
for ratification status of the core international human rights treaties.     
86 CERD, article 5(d)(iii). 
87 The Dominican Republic ratified the ACHR on January 21, 1978.  Please see the OAS website 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm for ratification 
status of the ACHR.   
88ACHR, article 20(2).   
89 CMW, article 29.   
90 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, G.A. Res. 896 (IX). The Convention was signed by 
the Dominican Republic on December 5, 1961, but not yet ratified. 
91 Ibid., article 1.   
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(VCLT), the Dominican Republic has an obligation “to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose” of this convention. 92 Clearly, Sentence 168-13, which 
effectively rendered many stateless, is contrary to the “object and purpose” of an 
instrument aimed at reducing statelessness.  The Dominican Republic is urged to ratify 
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness to further demonstrate its commitment 
to reducing this vulnerable status. 
 
The Dominican Republic and the Inter-American System 
  
The Dominican Republic recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (IACtHR) in February 1999.93  Moreover, in November 2003, the 
Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic established that IACtHR judgments are 
“binding and of equal weight” with national laws, 94 holding domestic and international 
law as the two principal sources of Dominican constitutional law.95  In a reversal of 
course, the newly formed Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic declared in 
Sentence 265-14 (November 2014) that the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the IACtHR 
was unconstitutional.96 
In October 2005, the IACtHR entered its first judgement against the Dominican 
Republic in the Case of the Yean and Bosico Children v. The Dominican Republic.97 
Yean and Bosico concerned two Dominican girls of Haitian descent who were denied 
birth certificates by the Registry Office.  Both girls were born in the Dominican 
Republic.98  The IACtHR found “that for discriminatory reasons, and contrary to the 
pertinent domestic norms, the State failed to grant nationality to the children, which 
constituted an arbitrary deprivation of their nationality . . . in violation of Articles 20 
[right to nationality] and 24 [right to equal protection] of the American Convention, in 
relation to Article 19 [rights of the child] thereof, and also in relation to Article 1(1) [non-
discrimination clause] of the Convention, to the detriment of the children Dilcia Yean and 
                                                 
92 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), May 23, 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, p. 336, article 18(a), accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html.   The 
Dominican Republic acceded to the VCLT on April 1, 2010.   
93 Please see the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights website for status regarding recognition of 
the jurisdiction of the IACtHR, accessed June 11, 2015. 
https://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm.    
94 Open Society Justice Initiative, “Compromised Right to Nationality,” 9. (citing Supreme Court of the 
Dominican Republic, Resolution No. 1920-2003 (November 13, 2004)).     
95 United Nations Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15(a) 
of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 : [Universal Periodic Review] : Dominican Republic, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/6/DOM/1, § 2.3, para 21, (August 27, 2009), accessed June 11, 2015.   
http://www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/dominican_republic_upr_2009_report.pdf. 
96 Dominican Republic Constitutional Tribunal, Sentencia TC/0256/14, 2014,  51 available at 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/sites/default/files/documentos/Sentencia%20TC%200256-
14%20C.pdf, accessed June 4, 2015 (“PRIMERO: DECLARAR la inconstitucionalidad del Instrumento de 
Aceptación de la Competencia de la CIDH suscrito por el presidente de la República Dominicana el 
diecinueve (19) de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y nueve (1999), por los motivos que figuran en el 
cuerpo de esta sentencia.”).   
97 David C. Baluarte, “An Island Shakes as Human Rights and Sovereignty Clash,” Human Rights Brief 13, 
no. 2 (2006): 25, accessed June 12, 2015, https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/13/2baluarte.pdf.    
98 Yean and Bosico, para 3.   
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Violeta Bosico.”99   
This case is of particular significance in that it represents the first time that the 
IACtHR established “that the right to nationality could not be limited based on 
discriminatory purposes, and that the migration status of parents could not be inherited by 
their children for purposes of denying nationality.”100  Consequently, the Court ordered, 
inter alia, “the Dominican Republic to reform its birth registration system to eliminate its 
discriminatory elements, and to create an effective procedure to issue birth certificates to 
all children born on Dominican territory, regardless of their parents’ migratory status.”101 
Unfortunately, the Court’s judgment was unwelcomed by the Dominican Republic.102  
Even more troubling, as discussed infra, through legislative and constitutional changes 
the Dominican Republic further restricted the definition of who is a national, which had a 
disproportionate impact on Dominicans of Haitian descent.103  
The discriminatory practices described by the Court in Yean and Bosico did not 
cease. In 2010 the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Center for Justice and 
International Law (CEJIL) filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in a case involving the denationalization of Emildo Bueno Oguís, who was 
born in the Dominican Republic to Haitian parents. 104  The case of Bueno vs. Dominican 
Republic105 remains under consideration. 106   
Meanwhile, on October 22, 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
published its judgment in the Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican 
Republic. 107 This case concerned individuals who were expelled from the Dominican 
Republic to Haiti as well as difficulties in registering births and obtaining nationality for 
Dominicans of Haitian descent.108 
As Sentence 168-13 and Law 169-14 together with concomitant regulatory 
Decrees 327-13 and 250-14 were enacted during the proceedings, these were admitted as 
supervening facts. 109  Ruling against the Dominican Republic, the IACtHR noted the 
discriminatory and retroactive nature of both Sentence 168-13 and parts of Law 169-
14.110 In the case of Law 169-14, which the Dominican state views as remedying the 
                                                 
99 Ibid., para 174. 
100 Francisco Quintana, “Inter-American Court condemns unprecedented situation of statelessness in the 
Dominican Republic,” blog, European Network on Statelessness, October 27, 2014, accessed June 12, 
2015, http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/inter-american-court-condemns-unprecedented-situation-
statelessness-dominican-republic.    
101 Open Society Justice Initiative, “Compromised Right to Nationality,” 7.   
102 Baluarte, 28.   
103 See Open Society Justice Initiative, “Compromised Right to Nationality,” 7. 
104 Open Society Justice Initiative, Bueno v. Dominican Republic, last updated June 1, 2010, accessed June 
12, 2015, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/litigation/bueno-v-dominican-republic.  For a summary 
of the initial petition please see 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Petition%20Summary-20100601.pdf .    
105 Bueno v. Dominican Republic, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, petition filed, (June 
2010).   
106 Open Society Justice Initiative, Bueno v. Dominican Republic.  
107 Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians vs. The Dominican Republic, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR), August 28, 2014, accessed June 11, 2015, 
http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_282_ing.pdf.    
108 Ibid., para 1.   
109 Ibid., para 126. 
110 Ibid., paras 310-325. 
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shortcomings of Sentence 168-13, the Court found that articles 6, 8, and 11 “violated 
treaty-based obligations … in relation to recognition of juridical personality, to a name, 
and to nationality, as well as --- the right to identity.”111 
Shortly following the publication of the decision, the Dominican Republic issued 
a statement rejecting the judgment, calling it “untimely, biased, and inopportune.”112 
Moreover, the Dominican Republic affirmed its sovereignty in decisions related to 
nationality. 113  As mentioned previously, then in November 2014, the Constitutional 
Tribunal of the Dominican Republic found the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the 
IACtHR unconstitutional.114  Human rights groups have criticized the political nature of 
this ruling.115 
The Dominican Republic must respect its international human rights obligations, 
including completely implementing the decisions of the IACtHR.  As Amnesty 
International observed, withdrawing from the Court would be detrimental to rule of law 
development in the Dominican Republic, as it would foreclose an avenue to redress 
human rights violations.116  As such, it is imperative for the Dominican Republic to work 
with the IACtHR both to demonstrate its commitment to human rights and to protect 
those in the country.       
   
The Evolution of Dominican Law Pertaining to Issues of 
Citizenship and Migratory Status 
 
It is not surprising that Dominican domestic law pertaining to issues of citizenship 
and migration has been colored by the historically tenuous relationship between the 
Dominican Republic and its neighbor Haiti.  Specifically, the Dominican Constitution (in 
                                                 
111 Ibid., para 324. 
112 Presidencia República Dominicana,  “Declaración. Gobierno dominicano rechaza la Sentencia de la 
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,” Presidencia República Dominicana, 1, October 24, 2014, 
accessed June 12, 2015, http://www.scribd.com/doc/244178548/Declaracion-Gobierno-dominicano-
rechaza-la-Sentencia-de-la-Corte-Interamericana-de-Derechos-Humanos.  (“extemporánea, sesgada e 
inoportuna.”).   
113 Ibid. (“De la misma forma, sin que haya espacio a dudas, manifiesta su adhesión al artículo 1 del 
Convenio de la Haya, de 1930, que faculta a cada Estado para regular y determinar, de acuerdo a su 
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potestad del Estado para definir por sus normas internas el régimen de la nacionalidad.”) 
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its numerous forms and through subsequent amendments) and additional laws on 
migration have sought to determine and delineate the parameters of Dominican 
citizenship, as well as the rights of migrants. Over time, there has been an increasing 
trend in the Dominican Republic of restricting citizenship rights with a disproportionate 
impact on Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian migrants.  
The Evolution of Citizenship Law in the Dominican Republic 
 
Historically, the Dominican Civil Code had established the principle of 
nondiscrimination regarding the enjoyment of civil rights between Dominican citizens 
and non-citizens alike117 and provided for the freedom of entry into the country to non-
citizens “of good conduct and good health, subject to conditions and restrictions imposed 
by law” through the Migration Act No. 95 of April 17, 1939.118   
Under the Dominican Constitution – from 1929 119  120  until the constitutional 
revision of January 26, 2010 – Dominican citizenship had been granted to children born 
within the territorial boundaries of the Dominican Republic, regardless of their national 
origin, their skin color, or the social status of their parents,121 under the principle of jus 
soli, similar to other countries within the Americas.122 123  The only exceptions to jus soli 
citizenship related to children born to diplomats and consular officers and children born 
to foreign parents who were “in transit” at the time of birth.  Again, the Dominican 
Constitution of 1966 established a regime of jus soli citizenship for all persons born 
within Dominican territory unless their parents fell under the above categories.124  While 
the text of the “in transit” clause suggested its application to persons traveling through the 
country to another place (for a period of time no longer than ten days)125 126 and to those 
“not habitually residing in the locality in question,”127 over time, Dominican courts had 
increasingly interpreted the “in transit” clause and other Dominican authorities had 
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125  National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities, “República Dominicana: Reglamento de migración 
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implemented it in such a way that citizenship rights were effectively denied to 
Dominicans born to parents of Haitian origin.128  Beginning in the 1980s, officials within 
the offices of the Civil Registry began to curtail the ability of Dominicans of Haitian 
decent to access identity documentation necessary for the attainment of their civil rights, 
other publically provided benefits, and employment opportunities. 129  130   A new 
migration law in August 2004 (General Migration Law 285-04)131 further defined and 
qualified the “in transit” clause, and a subsequent number of administrative measures that 
were issued by the JCE in 2007132 provided grounds under which officials within the 
Civil Registry could deny the issuance of identity documentation to children born to 
“foreign parents” who previously obtained Dominican birth certificates (which serve as 
the primary form of documentation for Dominicans under the age of 18) 133  under 
“irregular circumstances.”134  The Dominican-born children of said irregular migrants 
would be provided with pink birth certificates in order to distinguish them as being non-
citizens.135 136  However, some have noted that it is problematic that Circular No. 17 fails 
to provide the objective criteria by which such “irregularity” is to be determined by Civil 
Registry officials.137  Nevertheless, perhaps it is not surprising that this de facto practice 
of systematically denying vital documentation to Dominicans of Haitian descent was 
ultimately codified into law in the January 26, 2010 amendment to the Dominican 
Constitution, adding that any person born to a foreign parent in transit or residing 
illegally in the Dominican territory was not entitled to Dominican nationality and was 
therefore an alien.138  Specifically, Article 18 of the 2010 Dominican Constitution (as 
referring to nationality) states that Dominicans are: 
 
1. The sons and daughters of a Dominican mother or father; 
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2. Those who enjoy Dominican nationality before the entry into force of this 
Constitution; 
3. Persons born in national territory, with the exception of children of 
members of foreign diplomatic and consular missions or foreigners who 
are in transit or reside illegally in Dominican territory.  All foreigners, 
defined as such by Dominican laws, are considered to be persons in 
transit.139  140 
 
However, some scholars have argued that it is difficult to accept the Dominican 
government’s position that all persons arriving irregularly into the country are therefore 
“in transit,” 141 especially considering that the Dominican government had previously 
conceded that children born within the territorial boundaries of its country were entitled 
to the Dominican nationality regardless of the migratory status of their parents.142 
The Evolution of Migration Law in the Dominican Republic 
 
In comparison with the Dominican laws establishing the rights of citizenship, the 
laws establishing the rights of migrants are somewhat more convoluted as they come 
from a number of sources.  Both the Migration Act No. 95 of April 17, 1939 and the 
Immigration Regulation No. 279 of May 12, 1939 made a distinction between foreign 
immigrants and nonimmigrants.  Specifically, Article 3 of the Migration Act No. 95143 
and Section 8 of the Immigration Regulation No. 279 stated that all “foreigners admitted 
into the Dominican Republic are immigrants”144 with the right to remain in the country 
indefinitely unless they fall under one of the following categories of “non-immigrants:” 
 
1. Visitors traveling for business, educational or recreational purposes; 
2. Persons who are passing through the Republic in transit to another exterior 
destination; 
3. Persons who are employed on a boat or airplane; or 
4. Temporary day labourers and their families.145   
 
The Civil Registry146 was created in order to provide official recognition and 
proof of Dominican nationality in the form of birth certificates, national identity cards, 
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and passports.147  At a much later date, the Constitutional Tribunal ruling called for an 
audit of the registration books that were recording the births of foreigners, specifically 
dating from June 21, 1929 until April 18, 2007.148 149  With the JCE’s implementation in 
April 2007 of the Registration Book of Children of Non-Resident Foreign Mothers in the 
Dominican Republic that had been created in 2004 under the General Migration Law 
285-04, 150 151 any other foreign births that were “improperly registered” in the Civil 
Registry would be transferred to this new registration book, affected individuals would be 
notified of their “improper” status, and they would be compelled to comply with Article 
151 of the General Migration Law 285-04.152 153 
Constitutional Revision of 2010 
 
The Dominican Republic has had no less than thirty-four constitutions since 
gaining independence from Haiti in 1844, which uniquely makes the Dominican Republic 
the source of the most constitutions in the world.154 155 156 157  In fact, a debate among 
scholars exists regarding the significance, if any, of the Dominican Republic’s numerous 
constitutions.  While some have argued that the number of constitutions reflect the 
unstable nature of the Dominican constitutional system, others have suggested that the 
seemingly high number of constitutions rather reflect the fact that Dominican 
constitutions since the 1930s have not made a distinction between the processes of 
constitutional amendment and replacement (i.e., Dominican practice dictates that a new 
constitution is created whenever an amendment is ratified, and most Dominican 
constitutions contain only minor modifications of previous constitutions).158    
The most recent constitution was adopted in 2010. The 2010 Constitution is 
particularly significant in that it consolidated earlier revisions to Dominican laws 
regarding issues of citizenship and migratory status, effectively ensuring that, going 
forward, only children of a Dominican national or legal resident could qualify for 
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Dominican nationality. 159   In addition, the 2010 constitutional changes codified the 
broadened “in transit” clause which prohibits the children of foreigners “in transit” or 
those residing illegally in the country from automatically gaining Dominican citizenship. 
The 2010 Constitution also led to the establishment of a Constitutional Tribunal, which 
has proven to be a key actor in shaping (and arguably reshaping) the definitions of 
citizenship and identity of many individuals within the Dominican Republic.  
The Establishment of the Constitutional Tribunal  
 
Title VII of the 2010 Constitution outlined the establishment of a Constitutional 
Tribunal whose mission is to guarantee the supremacy of the Constitution, to defend the 
constitutional order, and to protect fundamental rights. 160 161   The decisions of the 
Constitutional Tribunal are binding upon all state institutions and actors within the 
Dominican Republic, and the Tribunal has administrative and budgetary autonomy.162  
The Constitutional Tribunal has the authority to adjudicate on direct acts of 
unconstitutionality in violation of the laws, decrees, regulations, resolutions, and 
ordinances at the behest of a number of named figures (i.e., the President, the legislature, 
or “any person with a legitimate and juridically protected interest”), on international 
treaties before their ratification by the legislature, on conflicts of competence regarding 
public authorities, and on any other issues established by law.163  Title VII of the 2010 
Constitution also established eligibility guidelines for the selection of Tribunal judges,164 
term limits for judges who sit on the Tribunal and for the Tribunal itself (i.e., in order to 
ensure a system of gradual change for the composition of the Tribunal),165 and provided 
the means by which the Tribunal could be regulated through law.166  
 
Law of the Dominican Republic (Post 2010) 
Constitutional Tribunal Sentence 168-13 
 
In 2008 Ms. Juliana Dequis Pierre went to the JCE in the municipality of Yamasá 
to obtain her first identity and voter card. With this simple act, Ms. Dequis catalyzed a 
series of events that would, after four years of appeals, lead the Constitutional Tribunal to 
release a binding judgment whose implementation would render countless Dominicans 
stripped of their citizenship. Indeed, Sentence 168-13 issued by the Constitutional 
Tribunal represents the culmination of several developments in Dominican law regulating 
the distribution of vital personal records, the definition of nationality, and most 
importantly the definition of what it means for a migrant to be “in transit.”  Despite its 
significance as a catalyst for the events currently underway in the Dominican Republic, 
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the eventual promulgation of the regularization and naturalization process from Juliana 
Dequis’ appeal, was, as will be explained in this analysis, circumstantial.   
The following section, which is an analysis and summary of Sentence 168-13, 
will begin by providing a background of the events surrounding Juliana Dequis’ 
judgment and an analysis of the grounds for admissibility before the Constitutional 
Tribunal in the Dominican Republic. This will be followed by an exploration of the basis 
for nationality in the Dominican Republic, pursuant to Sentence 168-13 and Article 11 of 
the Dominican Constitution. Having established the basis for nationality in the 
Dominican Republic, this will be followed by an analysis of whether the Dominican 
Republic violated the rights of Juliana Dequis, as established in 168-13. This section will 
be concluded with an analysis of the Constitutional Tribunal’s conclusions on the laws 
regulating the presence of foreigners in the Dominican Republic pursuant to the 
regularization plan of Act No. 285-40.  
Background   
 
In 2008 Ms. Juliana Dequis appeared at the Municipality Center of Yamasá, 
where she was born, to seek her first identity and voter card. However, officials at the 
Municipality Center told Juliana that she could not receive her cards because her name 
sounded Haitian. According to her records, Juliana Dequis was born in the town of 
Yamasá in the Province of Monte Plata on April 1, 1984 to Nelo Dissel Jean and Lucia 
Pierre.167  
Upon having her documents rejected by the Municipality of Yamasá, Juliana 
brought her complaint to the Civil, Labor and Commercial Chamber of the Court of First 
Instance of the Judicial District of Monte Plata.  The Court of First Instance rejected the 
complaint filed by Juliana Dequis under the pretense that although Juliana Dequis did file 
her birth certificate with the Court of First Instance, the photocopies provided by Juliana 
were of no probative value before the Court. Pursuant to “actori incumbit probatio”, 
which is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof to the party being charged168, the 
Court rejected Juliana’s declaration of amparo169 on July 10, 2012 in Judgment No. 
473/2012.170 
Subsequently, on July 30, 2012 Juliana filed an appeal against Judgment No. 
473/2012 with the Secretary of the Court of First Instance. In this appeal Juliana alleged 
that Judgment No. 473/2012 violated her fundamental rights since it left her in a “state of 
uncertainty”171 not only as a result of the actions committed by the JCE in failing to 
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accept her documents, but now because the Court of First Instance issued no definitive 
judgment on her status, thereby failing to protect her rights.172 173 The appeal did not 
focus on the issuance of the identity or voter cards per se but instead on the violation of 
Juliana’s right to have an effective decision issued by the Court of First Instance. 
The decision of the Court of First Instance is a critical component in 
understanding the roots of the crisis underway in the Dominican Republic as it lays the 
groundwork for the legal position maintained by the Constitutional Tribunal. According 
to the Court of First Instance, nationality is an aspect of sovereignty that cannot be 
defined by the will of an ordinary judge, a statement that justifies the need for the 
involvement of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Court of First Instance also contends that 
Dominican legislation clearly establishes that not everyone born in the territory of the 
Dominican Republic will be Dominican. This, the Court claims, is established in the 
Dominican Constitution of 1844 and is a principle that is maintained since the reform of 
1999 (based on the Constitution of 1929). Finally, the Court of First Instance professes 
that the JCE has the legal competence to investigate and take any action deemed pertinent 
to purge the Electoral Register of fraudulent entries.  The Court of First Instance bases its 
judgment against Juliana on these pronouncements and ruled that:  
 
(1) Juliana Dequis was registered irregularly before the Civil Registry 
Office of Yamasá […] appearing as the daughter of Haitian Nationals  
(2) Juliana’s parents are foreigners who unlawfully and irregularly 
enrolled their child in the register of civil status thereby violating the 
Constitution in force at the time of the declaration174 
 
As a result, Resolution No. 12-2007 issued by the Court of First Instance established 
regulations that allowed for the temporary suspension of the issuance of certificates of 
Civil Status for records that were registered fraudulently or irregularly and in violation of 
the Constitution.  The Court’s reasoning for adopting such a harsh stance was to shield 
the Civil Registry from fraud, forgery and impersonation. However, in doing so the Court 
blatantly disregarded Juliana’s rights as a Dominican citizen and the rights of all 
Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic.   
Implications of the Court of First Instance’s Judgment before the Constitutional Court 
 
The Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic, created in 2010, hears 
cases that are of special constitutional significance, of importance for the interpretation, 
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application and overall effectiveness of the Constitution, or for determining the context, 
extent and protection of fundamental rights.175 The Constitutional Tribunal found Juliana 
Dequis’ case to be of universal constitutional significance since it presented a conflict on 
the fundamental right to nationality and citizenship, the right to employment, the right to 
free movement and the right to vote. By undertaking the appeal of Juliana’s case the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s aim was to analyze: 
 
(1) The seizure of the appeals court by the plaintiff and the judgment issued by the 
court of appeals 
(2) The determination of jurisdiction for regulating the regime of nationality 
(3) Juliana Dequis’ breach of the legal requirement for the identity and voter cards; 
and 
(4) the legal viability of Dominican migration policy and the institutional and 
bureaucratic shortcomings of the Civil Registry 
 
The Constitutional Tribunal’s first erroneous claim set forth in Sentence 168-13 is 
that Juliana Dequis and other Dominicans of Haitian descent will not be stateless as a 
consequence of the ruling.  In an argument rooted entirely in the Court of First Instance’s 
judgment in Resolution No. 12-2007, the Tribunal postulates that pursuant to Article 11 
of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Haiti, every individual born of a Haitian 
father or Haitian mother is entitled to Haitian citizenship. The Court rationalizes that 
although Juliana is not entitled to Dominican nationality, given that she is (according to 
the Court’s interpretation of the Haitian Constitution) entitled to Haitian nationality she 
will not be in a condition of statelessness. Since Juliana Dequis’ parents are foreigners 
“in transit” and not naturalized in the Dominican Republic, the loss of Haitian citizenship 
does not apply to them as outlined in Article 13 of the Haitian Constitution of 1987. As 
such, pursuant to the Haitian Legislation on the Duties of the Embassy, the Constitutional 
Tribunal claims that Juliana’s parents had a responsibility to register her birth with the 
Embassy, the failure to do so was an attempt to defraud the Civil Registry.  
The Tribunal underscores that the obligation to regularize the stay of Haitian 
workers in the Dominican Republic, to avoid having them fall into an illegal status, is 
regulated by the Modus Operandi that was signed between the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti on November 21, 1939. Articles 10 and 11 of the Modus Operandi state that 
nationals of either State who are on the territory of the other may continue their stay in 
the state provided that these nationals conform to the provisions of relevant immigration 
laws. According to Sentence 168-13, the Modus Operandi provided a grace period of 
three months for those individuals in violation of the relevant immigration laws to 
regularize their status.  
Despite the claims of the Dominican Republic, a consequence of Sentence 168-13 
is that Dominicans of Haitian descent will be left stateless and in a condition of extreme 
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vulnerability considering that the judgment, “disproportionately affects individuals who 
are already subject to multiple forms of discrimination, in particular based on race and 
poverty.”176 
The next confounding issue is that despite regional custom and general law 
surrounding nationality, as discussed previously, the Constitutional Tribunal provides a 
narrow interpretation of nationality and asserts that,  
 
In general, nationality is considered a legal and political bond between a person 
and a State; but, more precisely it is not only a legal bond but also a sociological 
and political bond whose conditions are defined and established by the State. This 
is a legal bond, due to the multiple rights and obligations of a civil nature that 
arise from it; it is a sociological bond because it implies the existence of a set of 
historical, linguistic, racial and geopolitical features, among others, that make and 
sustain particular idiosyncrasies and collective aspirations; and political because it 
essentially gives access to the powers inherent in citizenship, that is the possibility 
to elect and be elected to public office in the State Government.177 
 
The Constitutional Tribunal adopts this conception of nationality to demonstrate that the 
legal conditions for the acquisition of nationality are based entirely in domestic law.  
However, the definition adopted by the Tribunal is inundated with racial overtones that 
point to the nefarious nature of Sentence 168-13. The Open Society Justice Initiative 
expressed concern in a press release in October 2013 that the judgment issued by the 
Tribunal “employs a definition of citizenship that is impermissibly discriminatory, 
referencing racial and linguistics features in demarcating citizenship.”178 As a State Party 
to CERD, the Dominican Republic has a responsibility to ensure “equal protection before 
the law in granting nationality.”179 
Having narrowly demonstrated that the standard for defining nationality is based 
on domestic law, the Constitutional Tribunal introduces additional reasons that Juliana 
Dequis does not meet the conditions of a judgment in favor of the issuance of an electoral 
identity card: 
 
(1) her birth certificate is under investigation pursuant to ruling 285-07 
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(2) she does not meet the conditions envisaged in the Constitution for acquiring 
Dominican nationality for children born in the country to foreign parents in transit 
 
The second reason enumerated above has had significant repercussions on the community 
of Dominicans of Haitian descent born and raised in the Dominican Republic. The 
Constitutional Tribunal maintains that Juliana’s parents are foreigners and that they 
illegally and irregularly enrolled Juliana in the civil registry. Juliana’s father Mr. Nelo 
Dequis is a Haitian national in the Dominican Republic who worked in agricultural and 
industrial labor. According to an investigation conducted by the Tribunal, Mr. Nelo 
Dequis did not provide his national identity card when he went to register Juliana. The 
Court claims that Juliana’s parents did not provide the required documents to legally 
register Juliana, which means her status and the legality of her birth certificate are 
dubious at best. Since Juliana’s parents did not have the necessary documents when 
registering her birth, the Tribunal rules that they must be considered seasonal workers. 
This placed Juliana’s family into the fourth group of nonimmigrant foreign workers 
pursuant to Dominican Law No. 95. According to Law No. 95 Article 3, foreigners can 
be admitted to the country as immigrants unless they fall into one of the following classes 
of nonimmigrants: 
 
(1) Visitors traveling on business, study, pleasure or curiosity; 
(2) Persons transiting through the territory of the republic traveling abroad; 
(3) Persons who are serving employed on ships or aircraft; 
(4) Seasonal workers and their families 
 
The law clarifies that nonimmigrants are only granted temporary status in the country 
unless they change their status by fulfilling the requirements for immigrants. Sentence 
168-13 explains that the law links the transience of a foreigner to the lack of a fixed legal 
residence in the country or the lack of ownership of a residence permit issued by the 
Dominican authorities.180 As a consequence, the Tribunal asserts that children born in the 
country of parents who come from these four groups of people are excluded from the 
acquisition of Dominican nationality.  
The Tribunal continues to state that foreigners in the country lacking a legal 
residence permit or who have illegally entered the country are in an irregular situation 
and therefore violate national laws and international treaties. As such, the parents of 
foreign children cannot declare that their children born in the country have rights to 
invoke amparo given that it is legally inadmissible to establish the existence of a right 
based on an illegal situation.181  
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The Tribunal goes on to reference the case of Dilicia Yean and Violeta Bosico. In 
particular, the Tribunal looks to Section V of the Dominican Republic’s Law regulating 
migration (No. 279 of May 1939), which underscores that to consider a person as a 
resident or “in transit,” the country must respect reasonable time limits and be consistent 
with its ruling especially with the judgment that a foreigner who develops connections in 
a State cannot be likened to a bystander or a person “in transit.”182 The Tribunal contends 
that the decision in the Yean and Bosico case was served in error and that the idea of a 
time limit is not relevant to non-resident aliens in the country.  
According to the Open Society Justice Initiative, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ decision in the Yean and Bosico case upheld the notion that the 
“migratory status of the parents can never constitute justification for the deprivation of 
nationality and that children cannot inherit the migratory status of their parents.” 183 
Furthermore, the time limit condition must be respected regardless of the status of the 
individual in question. Despite this, the ruling in 168-13 would be applied to about three 
generations of Dominicans by effectively denationalizing them with the intent of sending 
them to a country with which they have no roots or connections.  
One immediate red flag raised by the judgment of the Tribunal is the ex-post facto 
nature of the law. Most Western societies ban retroactive application of the law and this 
is even reflected in Article 47 of the Dominican Constitution of 1966, 184which was the 
Constitution in force when Juliana Dequis was born. In fact, non-retroactivity of the law 
is maintained in the 2010 Constitution of the Dominican Republic in Article 110. 185In 
order to circumvent this constitutional requirement that would restrict the impact of the 
Tribunal’s ruling only to current Haitian migrants residing in the Dominican Republic, 
the Tribunal claims that its judgment is based on Dominican Constitutions regulating 
such matters before the birth of Juliana Dequis. However, it was not until the 2010 
Constitution that being a child of parents “in transit” (under the more restrictive 
interpretation of “in transit”) was established as a restriction in obtaining Dominican 
citizenship. Article 18(2) of the Dominican Constitution of 2010 also clearly states, 
“those who enjoy the Dominican nationality before the entry into effect of this 
Constitution”, are citizens. 186 As such, the Constitutional Tribunal’s justification of 
retroactively applying the law is in direct conflict with the Constitution of the Dominican 
Republic. The retroactive application of the law, “… is an abusive and arbitrary action to 
strip nationality from three generations of Dominicans, by applying the law retroactively 
to 1929 as established by the Constitutional [Tribunal’s] ruling.”187 Although the 
Constitutional Tribunal has created its own questionable legal interpretation, “the 
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consequence is to place in limbo thousands of people who will not be able to cash a 
check, attend school, work, or do anything. It is civil death and since it applies to 
thousands of people, it is civil genocide.”188 
The Tribunal justifies the retroactive application of the law by emphasizing that 
the most significant change to the acquisition of nationality by jus soli was introduced in 
the Constitution of 1929 wherein the concept of foreigners “in transit” was first 
mentioned. The idea of foreigners “in transit,” according to the Constitutional Tribunal, 
represents an exception to the general rule of the application of jus soli in all subsequent 
Dominican Constitutions: 
 
• June 20, 1929 
• Article 8.2 of the Constitutional reforms of 1934, 1942 and 1947 
• Article 12.2 of the Constitutions of 1955, 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1962 
• Article 89.2 of the Constitution of 1963 
• Article 11.1 of the Constitutions of 1966, 1994 and 2002 
• And, Article 18.3 of the Constitutional reform of January 26, 2010 
 
The Tribunal concludes that the JCE’s decision to refuse issuing an identity and 
voter card to Juliana was legally sound in light of Constitutional and legal regulations in 
the Dominican Republic. According to the Tribunal, the Court of First Instance’s decision 
therefore did not constitute a violation of the fundamental rights of Juliana Dequis and 
that the issue of statelessness does not apply to this particular case. Despite the legal 
terminology used by the Tribunal to justify its actions, the reality is that Dominicans of 
Haitian descent would be left stateless under the ruling in 168-13. In a statement made 
before the Secretary of CARICOM, President Michel Martelly asserted that Sentence 
168-13 posed an immediate threat of violating the human rights of an entire community 
of vulnerable persons, Dominicans of Haitian descent. According to President Martelly, 
one of the major implications of the law was the potential mass statelessness it would 
create that would expound a loss of civil rights, including the right to vote and the loss of 
employment.189  
Although the Tribunal concluded that no persons living on its territory would be 
left insecure (stateless or otherwise) as a consequence of its ruling in 168-13, the Tribunal 
did rule that the vulnerabilities in the Dominican immigration system must be fixed in 
order to protect the integrity of the Dominican State. According to the Tribunal, the 
shortcomings in regulating how documents were provided after the proclamation of the 
Constitution of 1929 were rampant and allowed many migrants to defraud the Civil 
Registry.  The Tribunal therefore revived General Migration Law 285-04 as the means to 
re-shaping immigration in the Dominican Republic. Article 151 of Law 285-04 discusses 
the creation of a national plan that will regularize illegal aliens residing in the country. 190 
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Decision of 168-13 
 
The Tribunal mandated that within 10 working days the JCE must provide Juliana 
Dequis with her birth certificate so that she could submit it to the appropriate court to 
determine if the birth certificate was valid or invalid. The Tribunal also ruled that all 
individuals in a situation similar to Juliana must submit their documents to the 
appropriate court for validation. The JCE was also required to: 
 
(i) conduct a thorough audit of the Civil Registry of the Dominican Republic 
from June 21, 1929 to January 26, 2010 to identify and create a document of 
all foreigners registered in the Civil Registry of the Dominican Republic 
(ii) create a list of foreigners illegally enrolled in the Civil Registry based on the 
conditions required by the Dominican Constitution. Those individuals would 
be called aliens illegally registered in the Civil Registry of the Dominican 
Republic 
(iii) create a book of all special foreign births from June 21, 1929 to April 18, 
2007  
a. of non-resident foreign mothers pursuant to resolution  02-2008; and then 
transfer theses names to the Foreign Ministry and make the relevant 
notification to consulates, embassies or diplomatic missions as appropriate 
for legal purposes. 191   
 
The JCE is also required to submit a list of foreigners irregularly registered with the Civil 
Registry of the Dominican Republic to the Minister of the Interior and Police who chairs 
the National Immigration Council.  
The ruling mandates highly discriminatory procedures that according to the Open 
Society Justice Initiative would constitute a breach of international prohibitions against 
racial and ethnic discrimination.192 According to the Open Society Justice Initiative, state 
sovereignty is legally restricted by prohibitions against racial and ethnic discrimination, a 
principle that is integral to all international and regional human rights instruments.193 
Although the Constitutional Tribunal maintains that the ruling of 168-13 is not racist in 
nature, it disproportionately targets a very narrow group, Dominicans of Haitian descent, 
which as mentioned goes against human rights obligations to ensure equal protection 
before the law.  
327-13 (Regularization Plan) 
 
On November 22, 2013, the National Council of Migration published a Proposal 
for a Project on a Regularizing Decree Relative to the National Plan to Regularize 
Foreigners in an Irregular Migratory Situation in the Dominican Republic.194 This 
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Proposal, which laid the legal foundation for the ensuing law known as Decree 327-13 or 
the National Plan for the Regularization of foreigners in an irregular migratory situation 
in the Dominican Republic, was created by the National Council of Migration to facilitate 
the implementation of the general rules envisioned by the Constitutional Tribunal in 
Sentence 168-13. The spirit behind 327-13 is that in order to ensure the creation of a 
cogent plan to regularize foreigners in an irregular migratory situation in the Dominican 
Republic, it is necessary to establish a regulatory framework that empowers the 
institutions tasked with implementing migration law in the Dominican Republic.  
The following section will highlight the most important Articles of the 
regularization plan in addition to providing analysis on the major legal themes arising 
from this decree.  
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Decree, the purpose of this regularization plan is to 
implement the PNRE, which establishes the terms and conditions for the regularization of 
a migrant that is illegally based in the Dominican Republic. Ultimately if the regulations 
in the PNRE are followed an irregular migrant in the Dominican Republic will be able to 
acquire a legal status in the country under one of the categories established in the General 
Migration Law 285-04. 195 
Article 8 of the PNRE establishes who is subject to the regularization plan. 
Pursuant to Article 8, there are two umbrella groups that fall under the jurisdiction of the 
PNRE: 
 
1. Those who irregularly entered Dominican national territory in violation of the 
norms established in the laws and regulations on migration in the Dominican 
Republic and that remained in the country under the terms and conditions outlined 
in the PNRE 
2. Those who entered the country in a regular manner by adhering to the migration 
regulations and whose irregular condition arises from: 
a. Exceeding the time authorized for remaining in the country as a migrant  
b. Violating the conditions of entry196 
 
 Having established which migrants fall under the provisions of Decree 327-13, 
Articles 10-12 emphasizes the kinds of document that will be needed by migrants to 
successfully undergo the regularization process.197 According to Article 12, an irregular 
migrant may present any of the following documents: 
 
1. Passport or equivalent travel document;  
2. Identity document provided by consular authorities or any other authority 
in the country of origin; 
3. Birth certificate from the country of origin; 
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4. For an applicant that is part of a family group, marriage license, document 
of “spinsterhood/bachelorhood” or proof of cohabitation  
5. A document that can be verified as legitimate by authorities and that 
serves as a form of identification for the migrant applicant. 198   
 
Article 12 provides that if an applicant is unable to obtain the necessary documents, they 
may submit an application. However if the missing documents are not filed prior to the 
plan’s deadline on February 28, 2015 then the application for regularization will not be 
considered.199 
 The remaining articles in the regularization plan are dedicated to expanding on the 
criteria for registering as envisioned by the regularization plan pursuant to Article 14. The 
following conditions were established as the basic criteria of the plan: 
 
1. The time of filing and length of residence in the Dominican Republic;  
2. Ties to Dominican society; 
3. Labor and socio-economic conditions; and 
4. Regularization as an individual or family unit200 
Law 169-14 (Naturalization Plan) 
 
In May 2014, President Medina issued Law 169-14 in response to the 
international outcry generated by Sentence 168-13, which effectively left a large swath of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent stateless. The following section will provide an overview 
of the provisions mandated by Law 169-14.  
Law 169-14 begins by acknowledging the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal 
on January 26, 2010. It further affirms the binding power of the decisions made by the 
Constitutional Tribunal. However, the limits of the Constitutional Tribunal are also 
acknowledged with regards to its role in issuing judgment 168-13 on September 23, 
2013. Law 169-14, in the tone it adopts, represents a stark transition from Sentence 168-
13. In fact, it acknowledges not only the role the Dominican State has in creating the 
current situation, but also the role the state has in resolving the status of Dominicans of 
Haitian descent.  
 
That guided by these principles, the Dominican State, through its representative 
bodies, is called upon to find a solution to the problem faced by people who, 
although irregularly registered in the Civil Registry by the State itself, have acted 
throughout their lives under the premise that they benefit from the Dominican 
nationality and have had, on that basis, an undeniable attachment to our 
society.201 
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Law 169-14 identifies two populations in the Dominican Republic subject to regulation:  
  
a) the descendants of foreign parents in irregular immigration status whose birth 
records were registered by the State by the Officials of Civil Status [Group A] 
b) foreigners born in the Dominican Republic but that were not registered in the 
Civil Registry [Group B] 
 
Article 1 of Law 169-14 explains that the scope of the law is twofold in establishing: 
 
a) a special regime for the benefit of children of foreign non-resident fathers and 
mothers that were born in the country between the period of June 16, 1929 to 
April 18, 2007 and registered in the Dominican Civil Registry records based on 
documents not recognized by the regulations in force for such purposed at the 
time of registration; 
b) the registration of children of foreign parents that were born in the Dominican 
Republic and are not registered in the Civil Registry202 
 
Article 2 declares that the JCE will regularize or transcribe all the persons in 
Group A listed above to the Civil Registry. This process will be free of charge to these 
beneficiaries and at the end of the process they will be Dominican nationals.  The cédula 
will be provided to all members of Group A.203 
The members of Group B (person who is the child of irregular foreign parents that 
were born in the Dominican Republic but were not registered in the Dominican Civil 
Registry) are required to register in the registry for foreigners pursuant to the guidelines 
set forth in the General Migration Law 285-04. Article 6 however, mandates that an 
application for registry must be submitted to the Ministry of Interior and Police no later 
than 90 days from the effective date of Law 169-14 to be considered valid.204 The 
Ministry of Interior and Police subsequently have a period of 30 days to process the 
application given no objection from the JCE.205 After the application is processed the 
beneficiary of the regularization process has sixty days to comply with the provisions of 
Decree 327-13, which establishes the National Plan of Regularization of Foreigners in 
irregular immigration status (PNRE). 206 
Pursuant to Article 8 of Law 169-14 the members of Group B regularized 
according to the PNRE may be naturalized after two years have passed since obtaining 
one of the immigration categories established in the General Migration Law 285-04.207 
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Regularization: The National Plan to Regularize Foreigners (PNRE) 
 
Following the 168-13 ruling, the immediate next step for the Dominican 
government was to develop and implement the “national plan to regularize illegal 
foreigners located in the country” called for in the sentence.208 In theory, a plan to grant 
documentation and consequently safeguard basic human rights for migrants is a laudable 
undertaking and demonstrates the government’s recognition that irregular migration is a 
significant and longstanding issue in the country. However, from the outset, 
implementation of the national regularization plan (or as it is commonly referenced, the 
PNRE) has been fraught with problems including insufficient bandwidth to meet the 
number of applicants, unreasonably short timelines, confusing and poorly publicized 
information, and disregard for the specific needs of Haitian migrants, by far the largest 
migrant group in the country. The PNRE has only regularized a few hundred migrants 
since June 2013,209 failing to meet the government’s goal of regularizing all irregular 
migrants in the Dominican Republic. Moreover, the government’s initial attempt to use 
the PNRE to treat Dominicans of Haitian descent, who should be pursuing naturalization, 
as migrants in need of regularization is deeply concerning and was condemned by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the international community.210  
After clarifying the legal implementation of the Regularization Plan, this section 
of the report will discuss the problems with the practical implementation of PNRE and 
end with recommendations to the Dominican Government for how to proceed following 
the June 17, 2015 deadline. 
Legal Implementation & Requirements of the PNRE 
 
Implementation of the regularization requirement in Sentence 168-13 commenced 
immediately in November 2013 with the creation of additional legal texts outlining the 
process and specifying the exact requirements for applicants. On November 22, 2013, the 
National Council of Migration published a Proposal for a Project on a Regularizing 
Decree Relative to the National Plan to Regularize Foreigners in an Irregular Migratory 
Situation in the Dominican Republic.211  This proposal emphasized the urgency of 
creating such a migration plan, referenced earlier laws calling for similar plans, 
highlighted specific statistics on migrants in the country, and, most importantly, outlined 
the Plan’s specific implementation phases. Then, on November 29, 2013, President 
Medina signed Decree 327-13, which created the official “National Plan to Regularize 
Foreigners in an Irregular Migratory Situation in the Dominican Republic,” the PNRE.212 
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The Decree established the Ministry of the Interior and Police as the principal agency 
responsible for implementation. The process is specifically implemented through the 
Office of the General Directorate of Migration, which falls under the purview of the 
Ministry of the Interior and Police.213 Although there are relatively robust legal 
documents indicating the objectives, processes, and timeline for the regularization of 
migrants, the implementation of the PNRE has been stymied by too aggressive timelines 
and complex bureaucracy. 
The aim of the PNRE is to regularize the large number of migrants with an 
“irregular migratory status” in the Dominican Republic by giving them a pathway to a 
regularized status. Based on numbers from a 2012 study by the National Office of 
Statistics (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas), the Dominican government estimates that 
there are a total of 524,632 migrants in the country who were born outside the Dominican 
Republic, 502,297 (95.78%) of whom have identification documentation from their 
country of origin and 22,135 (4.22%) who do not. Of those numbers, the government 
estimates that 458,233 (87.34%) are originally from Haiti.214 However, the government 
admits in the Proposal that it has been unable to establish the total number of migrants in 
an irregular status.215 Moreover, the accuracy of those statistics is dubious for two main 
reasons: 1) those numbers likely do not capture migrants unwilling to share their 
migratory status for fear of deportation; and 2) those numbers likely do not accurately 
capture predominantly Haitian migrant populations living and working in rural areas like 
the bateyes. Despite the inherent difficulty of accurate projections, the Dominican 
government estimated receiving 200,000 applications to the PNRE upon the launch of the 
program; by late March 2015 only 3,000 had been analyzed and 300 regularization 
documents issued. Meanwhile, over 175,000 applications had been submitted, indicating 
that the 200,000 number will likely be met or exceeded.216 
From the outset, the PNRE was designed to be a separate and temporary process, 
creating a specific residency and work permit for “irregular” migrants independent from 
any other immigration document. By the term “irregular” the government means migrants 
who do not have the necessary documentation to reside or work in the country, i.e. visas 
or permits.217 Yet, under the scope of Sentence 168-13, “regularization” does not mean 
the issuance of immigration or residency documents in the form of visas or cédulas. The 
regularization documents issued under the PNRE will allow registered migrants to remain 
in the country legally, but the PNRE does not specify for how long this residency and 
work permit will be effective.218  Since the PNRE is implemented via presidential decree, 
the validity of such regularization documents could be revoked once President Medina 
leaves office in 2016. Civil society organizations, like MUDHA, are concerned that 
documents granted under the PNRE could be nullified in the future, as happened during 
similar documentation initiatives in the 1990s.219 The PNRE is a window of opportunity 
for migrants to become regularized, but as a temporary process, also involves uncertainty 
regarding the future validity of its unique regularization documents.   
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Implementing the requirements of Sentence 168-13 necessarily involved creating 
new immigration processes in a matter of months within existing government institutions. 
On paper, the PNRE requires applicants to confirm their identity via one of the following 
documents, even if the document is expired:  
 
1) Passport or travel document 
2) Personal identity documentation issued by consular authority or any other 
authority in the country of origin 
3) Birth certificate from the country of origin 
4) For an applicant that is part of a family group, marriage license, document of 
“spinsterhood/bachelorhood” or proof of cohabitation  
5) A document that can be verified as coming from a legitimate authority and 
that serves for the identification of the foreign applicant220 
 
The PNRE then requires that applicants satisfy four requirements in addition to 
confirming their identity: 
 
1) The time the foreign person has been residing in the country 
2) Ties to Dominican society 
3) Work and socio-economic conditions 
4) Regularization of persons individual or by the family (information regarding 
the nuclear family)221 
 
The Ministry of the Interior and Police outlined the specific documents that could be 
provided to satisfy the above four requirements in a comprehensive though lengthy 
brochure published in Spanish and Haitian Creole.222 While it is positive that the 
government will accept a wide-ranging number of documents, the sheer scale of 
permissible documents is extremely confusing, particularly for migrants who must then 
obtain those documents from other government offices and their employers.  
In cases where an applicant did not have the above documentation prior to 
February 28, 2015, the Decree granted them a grace period during which they could 
apply to the PNRE and then follow up with the necessary documents.223 This grace 
period was particularly valuable for Haitian migrants who had to obtain identity 
documents from the Haitian government. However, the deadline for the grace period 
expired on February 28, 2015, which in practice gave applicants an insufficient 10 
months to undergo the lengthy process of receiving documents from Haiti.  
Implementation in Practice 
 
Beyond the grace period, the overall 18 month timeline specified in the PNRE has 
proved far too short for government offices to create robust mechanisms for efficiently 
receiving and reviewing applications. Rather than specifying a future start date for 
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implementation, the PNRE became immediately active on November 22, 2013,224 which 
did not allow an organization period for government offices to develop appropriate 
policies and prepare for the influx of applications. However, while the PNRE has been in 
effect on paper from November 22 2013 through June 16, 2015, the application only 
opened in June 2014,225 which gave offices a short 6 months to organize themselves but 
leaving applicants 12 months, not 18, to register. Along with the short timeline, the 
capacity of government offices is woefully insufficient: the government initially 
projected that 200,000 migrants would register,226 but there are just 25 government 
offices statewide to process these applications.227 Meanwhile, from June 2014 - February 
2015, those same government offices were also charged with implementing the parallel 
naturalization process under Law 169-14. It is consequently disappointing, but 
unsurprising that by the spring of 2015 the government had only analyzed 3,000 cases out 
of 175,000 total applications and had only issued 300 regularization documents.228 The 
short timeline along with lack of office capacity has hamstringed the PNRE in issuing 
regularization documents. 
As William Charpantier of MENAMIRD has stressed, the vast majority of 
migrants in the Dominican Republic are Haitian, so developing migration policies should 
necessarily involve considering the needs of Haitians and people of Haitian descent in the 
country.229 Although the official PNRE brochure was published in Spanish and Haitian 
Creole, ostensibly to reach a Haitian audience, the requirements of the PNRE do not 
sufficiently address the unique needs of Haitian migrants. Firstly, the application timeline 
is unreasonably short for Haitian migrants who have to undertake nebulous and highly 
bureaucratic processes to gain documents from the Haitian government, Dominican 
government offices, and their employers. Secondly, Haitian migrants are generally 
marginalized into low-income positions in society where they have limited access to 
information to understand the processes and funds to pay for the various documents they 
have to secure. Thirdly, on paper the Decree is relatively flexible and expansive on the 
five types of documents applicants can provide to establish their identity. However, in 
practice many Haitian migrants lack such documents either because they never received 
them from the Haitian government or because their documents were taken from them 
while crossing the border or beginning work in the bateyes.230 Finally, and of significant 
concern to human rights groups, Haitian applicants are being directed to secure an official 
and current passport from the Haitian government, even though expired documents are 
legally acceptable according to the law.231 For Haitian applicants, the PNRE’s 
requirements have proven to be cumbersome, costly, and near impossible to complete 
within the allotted timeframe.  
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For Haitian migrants, a compounding problem has been navigating the Haitian 
Government’s Identification and Documentation Program for Haitian Immigrants 
(PIDIH).232 When initially implemented, the PIDIH committed to deliver Haitian 
identification documents such as passports and identification cards, within 15-20 days of 
application. In actuality, anecdotal reports indicate that the process can take upwards of 
five months, if not longer.233 In a January 2015 interview with journalist Juan Bolivar 
Diaz on Tele Antillas, the then Haitian Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Fritz 
Cineas,234 recognized the delay, stating, “We initially thought that the documents could 
be delivered within 15 to 20 days, but we were unable to meet demand. It was a 
miscalculation on our part to believe that we could provide these documents in such a 
short time.” According to statistics gathered by Haiti Libre, in October 2014, 120,000 
people had applied to the PNRE, of which fewer than 75,000 Haitian applicants had the 
required documents from the Haitian government, and fewer than 500 applicants had met 
all of the documentation requirements.235 By May 2015, only 52,000 Haitian migrants 
had applied to the PIDIH process and only 17,000 had received a passport or identity 
document.236 Meanwhile, the PNRE’s application window is set to close on June 17, 
2015, which means that Haitian migrants requiring documents from the Haitian 
government are unlikely to receive them in time to apply to the PNRE.237  
Despite the government’s characterization of the PNRE as “free and personal,”238 
in practice the process carries significant economic costs for Haitian applicants who have 
to navigate multiple requirements involving different government offices as well as 
seeking documents from their employers. Because migrants generally must travel 
significant distances to secure documents and pay at least 1,000 Pesos (or approximately 
$22 USD 239) to the Haitian government, both the direct and indirect costs may be 
prohibitive for many applicants. During a January 2015 meeting with MENAMIRD, 
representatives from civil society and religious organizations emphasized cost as the 
biggest barrier to entry for Haitian migrants. Coupled with cost, they cited lack of legal 
support to help applicants navigate the complicated regularization process.240 The 
Dominican Republic’s attempt to regularize thousands of migrants may be a missed 
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opportunity, due to monetary and legal barriers that prevent a large segment of the 
migrant populations from applying. 
An additional aim of the PNRE was initially to provide an avenue for Dominicans 
of Haitian descent under Group B– persons without documentation proving their 
Dominican nationality – a pathway to regularization.241  Law 168-13 specifically 
referenced the descendants of migrants born in the period between 1929-2007 as being a 
unique group, specifically referencing the case of Juliana Dequis Pierre discussed in 
detail earlier.242 The PNRE was consequently designed to meet Law 168-13’s dual 
requirements: 1) that the Dominican Government create a national migration plan as 
specified under the Migration Law 285-2004; and 2) address the problem of people in an 
irregular migratory status by virtue of the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling on “in transit.” 
Sentence 168-13 estimates the total number of Haitian migrants, including the population 
of Dominicans of Haitian descent, as 668,145.243 That number is likely grossly 
underestimated and near impossible to calculate, considering it should contain all the 
descendants (children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren spanning generations) of 
Haitian migrants born in the period between 1929-2007 who have rightly considered 
themselves Dominicans. With the issues of Dominicans of Haitian descent in mind, the 
PNRE appears less as a forward-thinking plan to address irregular migration and more as 
a politicized attempt by the government to push Dominicans of Haitian descent to register 
as foreigners.  
Following international outrage over the issue of statelessness for Dominicans of 
Haitian descent, the Dominican government created the parallel naturalization process 
under Law 169-14, which will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section. 
However, now that the February 1 application deadline for Law 169-14 has passed, 
Dominicans of Haitian descent under Group B are again being directed to apply for 
regularization under the PNRE.244 As civil society organization MUDHA has 
emphasized, people in Group B simply do not have the home country identity documents 
required under the PNRE for several reasons: 1) they were not born in Haiti, are not 
Haitian citizens, and as such, do not have Haitian identification documents, 2) their 
parents or grandparents do not have identification documents because such documents 
were never issued or were confiscated at some point in the tumultuous period between 
1929 to 2007 where documentation requirements were lax.245 As such, the PNRE is truly 
an inappropriate mechanism for addressing the threat of statelessness facing Dominicans 
of Haitian descent under Group B.  
While Law 169-14 somewhat mollified international concerns over statelessness, 
implementation of the naturalization plan alongside the PNRE created deep confusion for 
applicants and exacerbated capacity problems at the 25 government offices charged with 
implementing both plans. Already stretched thin by the PNRE, from June 2014 until 
February 1, 2015, government offices were also processing up to 40 applications a day to 
Law 169-14. The PNRE became entangled with the efforts under Law 169-14 to 
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naturalize Dominicans of Haitian descent with applicants being directed into the wrong 
processes both passively and actively by lack of clarification and by confused to 
negligent civil servants.246 The two processes also became intermingled as many families 
have both Haitian-born migrants and Dominican-born citizens. Consequently, civil 
society organizations had the dual task of assisting families with both processes during 
the application window for Law 169-14.247 Now that the February 1 deadline for Law 
169-14 has passed, such organizations have the continued task of making sure families 
understand the processes. Undocumented parents originally from Haiti fall under the 
PNRE as migrants, meaning that their children fell under Group B of the Naturalization 
Plan but as of February 1, must also apply under the PNRE. Despite being born in the 
Dominican Republic, these Dominican children with Haitian parents are considered “in 
transit” and consequently migrants by the government. Finally, it is crucial to underscore 
that running through all the government bureaucracy, capacity problems, and confusing 
processes is a pernicious, pervasive institutional racism that views all people with Haitian 
features as “other.” Beyond treating Dominicans of Haitian descent as second-class 
citizens, Dominican society has historically and under Laws 168-13 and 169-14, sent a 
message that all people of Haitian descent are migrants. As such, it is disappointing but 
unsurprising that Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent have consistently 
been lumped together first under the PNRE and then in government offices where Law 
169-14 was ostensibly designed to give Dominicans of Group B a pathway to reclaim 
their rightful citizenship. 
Civil society within the Dominican Republic is divided on the merits of having 
Group B apply for regularization under the PNRE. MUDHA is deeply concerned that 
registering for the PNRE will make Group B a target for future ill treatment and 
expulsion from the country as happened in the 1990’s.248 That said, some civil society 
organizations like MENAMIRD have been encouraging and assisting Group B with 
registering under the PNRE, because at least such registration gives people a pathway to 
documentation. Only through holding appropriate documentation can individuals access 
basic rights to government services and reduce the risk of deportation once the PNRE 
application window closes. Yet, during the fact-finding trip for this Report, there was 
general consensus among the organizations interviewed that the PNRE and Law 169-14 
inadequately meet the needs of Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent. 
However, while both processes are flawed, it is recognized that the government has 
attempted to address the migration and statelessness issue within the Dominican Republic 
rather than immediately undertaking deportation of irregular migrants and expulsion of 
stateless Dominicans. 
During the application process, there is a moratorium on deportations for migrants 
applying to the PNRE; migrants are given a confirmation document after submitting their 
documents that indicates that they have applied.249 However, this moratorium will end for 
all migrants, regardless of their application to the PNRE, on June 17, 2015. The 
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Dominican government has made it clear that it will undertake deportations at that time 
and has begun talks with the Haitian government in preparation for the projected increase 
in repatriations of Haitian migrants to Haiti.250 Despite the moratorium, racial profiling of 
people of Haitian descent has led to ad-hoc, unofficial deportations of Haitian migrants 
and Dominicans of Haitian descent, even of those who hold documents.251 Moreover, 
there are reports from civil society organizations such as MUDHA that many people who 
qualify for the PNRE are afraid to apply for fear of being identified for future 
deportation. A pattern of deporting people trying to apply for regularization has been 
occurring since the 1990’s and affects Dominicans of Haitian descent as well as Haitian 
migrants.252  
Amnesty International has been active in protecting Haitian migrants and 
Dominicans of Haitian descent. In an Urgent Action published on January 28, 2015, 
Amnesty denounced a “mass deportation” on January 27, 2015 of 51 people en route to 
enroll in the Naturalization Plan under Law 169-14. The group included 30 children, all 
born in the Dominican Republic before 2007, their 7 Haitian mothers, and 14 other 
Haitian migrants traveling to enroll in the PNRE. On their way to the enroll office in San 
Juan de la Maguana, their two buses were stopped at a military checkpoint and redirected 
to the border town Elias Piña to obtain official permission to proceed from the Migration 
Directorate office there. At that point, they were accused of being “illegal wanderers” and 
immediately deported (expulsed in the case of the Dominican children) to Haiti without 
time for legal recourse or appeal. Following pressure (not attributed to any one actor in 
the report by Amnesty International), the group was authorized to return, though 
according to Amnesty such permission did not result in immediate return.253  
Despite the Dominican Government’s lofty aspirations to regularize the thousands 
of undocumented migrants in the country, the temporary regularization policy under the 
PNRE has only regularized .1% of applicants as of spring 2015254 and even fewer of the 
total number of migrants in general. The PNRE’s performance becomes even more grim 
considering the barriers that preclude Haitian migrants from applying, when they are by 
far the largest population of migrants in the country. Additionally, the use of the PNRE to 
register Group B Dominicans of Haitian descent is deeply concerning, because such 
people are Dominican by birth. Not to mention the arbitrary deportations of migrants and 
expulsions of citizens that are already occurring in the Dominican Republic despite the 
official moratorium under the PNRE. On paper, the Dominican Republic’s attempt to 
regularize and consequently grant fundamental rights to migrants, particularly the large 
population of Haitian migrants, is exemplary. In practice, implementation of the PNRE 
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has been a shamefully politicized process that, as of the publication of this report, has not 
delivered benefits to migrants and has further muddied the statelessness issue for 
Dominicans of Haitian descent by having them apply for status as foreigners in their own 
country.  
Restoration and Naturalization  
International criticism followed in the wake of Sentence 168-13 and its restrictive 
jus soli definition that turned hundreds of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent 
into migrants in their own country. Responding to the criticism, the Dominican 
government passed Law 169-14 on May 23, 2014 in order to provide the people 
negatively affected by Sentence 168-13 a pathway back to citizenship. Dominican 
authorities did not, however, change their rhetoric, rather they maintained that a part of 
the affected population had been granted citizenship by mistake even though they would 
now have their documents restored. For those Dominicans of foreign descent whose 
births had not been recorded, the new law envisioned the creation of a naturalization 
process through existing regularization mechanisms. 
Three Affected Groups 
Law 169-14 effectively created three tiers among those persons affected by the 
retroactive application of Sentence 168-13 on the issue of “in transit.” Two of these 
groups, the so-called Group A and Group B, were explicitly addressed in the law. The 
third group falls outside the purview of Law 169-14 and Dominican authorities considers 
the members of this group to be migrants.  
Group A 
 
Group A constitutes individuals with Dominican birth certificates, or otherwise 
recorded in the civil registry, who were born to undocumented, foreign parents. Initial 
numbers from Dominican authorities indicated that 24,392 people fell within this 
group.255 Other estimates indicate that some 200,000 people could be included in Group 
A.256 Many of the people who were included under this definition did not know that they 
were defined as such because they held documents, and had no reason to question the 
validity of those documents. Some only found out when they attempted to renew their 
identification cards as part of the Dominican authorities’ effort to introduce a biometric 
system.  
Under Law 169-14, these individuals were to have their citizenship restored.257 
Unlike the regularization process and the naturalization program for members of Group 
B, there is no formal process, or set application deadline, for individuals in Group A. This 
absence of a formal process termination carries certain risks; while the restoration is 
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supposed to be automatic, in practice, members of Group A have been subjected to a 
prolonged audit process.258 This audit is a legacy of Sentence 168-13 which mandated the 
JCE to transcribe birth certificates into a “transcription book” (libro de transcripciones). 
Birth certificates in this book look different from the old birth certificates and carry 
different numbers from the originals. The separate nature of these documents constitutes 




Group B comprises around 110,000 Dominican-born individuals of foreign 
parentage whose births were never registered.259 260 Without documents they were 
ineligible for the restoration envisaged for Group A under Law 169-14. Instead they were 
encouraged to enter a naturalization process in three steps. First, it requires them to 
register as “foreigners,” and subsequently apply for regularization through the General 
Law on Migration (or Law 285-04).261 Completing the second step, applying for 
regularization, requires presenting documentation different from that of applicants to the 
PNRE. Following Presidential Decree 250-14, which establishes the procedures for 
implementing Law 169-14, applicants were required to present one or more of the 
following documents:   
 
i. Live birth record issued by a public hospital or private health 
center, indicating the name of the mother, the baby’s gender, and 
date of birth; 
ii. Statements made before notary public by seven Dominican 
witnesses indicating the date and place of birth, the name of the 
child, and the names of the parents; 
iii. Sworn affidavit before notary public by the midwife who 
delivered the child, indicating the date and place of birth as well 
as the name of the mother; 
iv. Sworn affidavit before notary public by first- or second-degree 
family members who possess Dominican national 
documentation.262 
Actual naturalization of citizenship, the third step, would be possible only after a 
two-year period under the regularized migrant status, subject to a review of the 
applicant’s criminal record. During this two-year period, members of Group B only have 
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recourse to a residence permit. As the process closed on February 1, 2015, some sources 
put the official government figure of applicants to the naturalization program at 6,937,263 
whereas other sources put that figure at 8,755.264  Regardless, of the precise figure, the 
number of applicants is still very low compared to the affected population.  In March, 
Washington Gonzalez, Vice-Minister of Interior said that only 40 percent of applicants 
(using the 8,755 figure) for naturalization met the requirements as stipulated in Law 169-
14.265 Using the above numbers, even if applicants were to meet the requirements, the 
number of potential beneficiaries reached by the Dominican state’s program is at best 
limited to 8 percent of the total affected population, and at worst 6.3 percent.  Following 
Vice-Minister Gonzalez’s caution regarding 40 percent of applicants, these figures would 
drop to 3 and 2.5 percent respectively. As of late January 2015, no members of Group B 
had received their papers.266  
“Group C”267 
In addressing Groups A and B, Law 169-14 left out any individuals born between 
2007 and 2010. This period corresponds to that between adopting the new view on what 
constitutes “in-transit” (the Dominican Republic’s definition of a migrant) and the 
passing of the 2010 Constitution, after which migrants were unequivocally under the new 
definition. According to JCE figures, there are 21,449 individuals in this group who have 
been registered in the civil registry for foreigners (libro de extranjeros) and are referred 
to the regularization plan.268  
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Implementation of the Naturalization Program 
According to Presidential Decree 250-14, issued on July 23, 2014, any affected 
persons were to apply for naturalization within 90 days. The Decree thus left little room 
for planning the process and disseminating information to affected persons.  Following 
international criticism, in late October the Dominican government extended the period by 
another three months, and on February 1 the application window closed. However, the 
implementation of Law 169-14 remained ad hoc and consequently resulted in many 
problems. Moreover, the official discourse surrounding the naturalization process and the 
barriers faced by applicants effectively questioned the government’s intent. Taken 
together, the deficiencies apparent in the implementation process ran counter to 
effectively remedying the situation created by Sentence 168-13 and thus upholding the 
Dominican Republic’s human rights obligations. 
The Government’s Mixed Messages 
 
Though the naturalization process is separate from the regularization process 
(PNRE) directed at migrants, several factors muddle this distinction. Dominican 
authorities for example conflate the different groups in official discourse. This includes 
their view that restoring citizenship to members of Group A is only necessary because of 
past administrative mistakes. In his Independence Day speech on February 27, 2015 
President Danilo Medina reiterated that Law 169-14 established a special process for 
those whose births were registered “irregularly.”269  In the same speech, President 
Medina made clear that there would be no further extension of the process for Group B 
and pointed out that the PNRE would remain open until June 16.270 The PNRE of course 
requires applicants to present identification documents from a foreign country, access to 
which Group B members do not have. In intimating that they can simply avail themselves 
of a regularization plan designed for migrants, President Medina displayed a disregard for 
the plight of members of Group B that permeated the naturalization process.  
In response to international criticism of the effects of Sentence 168-13, 
Dominican authorities have maintained that their regularization process is more than the 
United States has done for its migrant community.271 This remains an undisputed fact, 
but does not address the situation of those Dominicans who lost their citizenship as a 
result of the sentence. That the naturalization process required members of Group B to 
register as foreigners did little to create a distinction between migrants and nationals 
stripped of their citizenship. As mentioned previously, these “former” nationals then had 
to enter the regularization process, further adding to the confusion. The procedural 
difference between the PNRE and the naturalization plan boils down to the 
documentation that applicants need to apply and that Group B members can apply for 
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naturalization after two years. Naturalization is thus not guaranteed and the uncertainty 
permeating the procedures has kept people from entering the process. Moreover, as 
stipulated by Decree 250-14, the offices established under the regularization scheme were 
to handle applications from Group B members as well.272 That there was no separation of 
physical space between the naturalization and regularization processes gave applicants 
more reason to question the authorities’ intent. 
 
Lack of Information 
A lack of public information about the naturalization program compounded the 
situation.  Following Decree 250-14, an official information campaign was to be 
implemented by the Executive Directorate of the National Regularization Plan.273 This 
campaign included radio advertisements, brochures, and informational meetings.274 Civil 
society representatives questioned its timing as the campaign only started in October, 
weeks before the initial deadline.275 Delays notwithstanding, it is unclear whether 
affected persons actually received information and whether those who did trusted it. This 
lack of trust or “culture of disbelief” stems in part from historical mistreatment, such as 
the regularization process in the 1990s, which ended in mass deportations.276 
Bottlenecks 
 
Throughout the naturalization process, three distinct bottlenecks constrained those 
interested in availing themselves of the plan: time, the number of registration offices, and 
the capacity of these offices. Dominican authorities anticipated some 55,000 applicants 
and initially opened a three-month application window. Taking into account the dearth of 
information regarding the process and the time needed to acquire the necessary 
documents, this initial period was far too short. After domestic and international 
criticism, it was extended by another three months in late October.  
Considering the tight timeframe that the Dominican authorities had set for 
themselves and how many possible applicants they expected,277 the number of 
registration offices was insufficient. As per Decree 250-14, the offices set up for the 
PNRE were designated to handle Group B applicants as well. Using conservative 
estimates of the target populations, the total number of individuals that had to be served 
by the PNRE offices exceeded 300,000. Because only about one thousand individuals 
from Group B successfully registered during the initial 90-day period, registering the 
remaining population in an additional 90 days can barely be deemed feasible even 
without factoring in the PNRE applicants.278  
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Dominican authorities list 31 office locations on the Ministry of Interior’s 
website, at least one for every province.279 However, the Ministry of Interior’s own 
online news section refers to 21 such offices throughout the country.280 Currently, the 
Dominican Republic has 31 provinces in addition to Distrito Nacional, where the capital 
Santo Domingo is located. Thus, not every province had a local office. Moreover, even in 
September and October of 2014, a number of offices remained closed. Others were open 
but still awaited the installation of the electronic registration system needed to process 
applicants.281 Even in fully operational facilities applicants reported offices being 
unstaffed during regular hours of operation and that electricity outages also disrupted the 
process.282  
Another bottleneck was the limited capacity of the existing offices, capable of 
only servicing around 40 people per day.283 Some offices did not reach even this figure, 
sometimes registering as few as ten individuals in one day.284 Prospective applicants 
were thus told to return on another day. These shortcomings should be viewed together 
with the financial burden that many applicants shouldered simply by traveling to the 
office in question. 
 
Indirect Costs 
In some instances, applicants faced high travel expenditures and long travel times. 
Concomitant losses of income and additional costs for accompanying children added to 
the financial burden, as did notarization of documents. Thus, while applying for 
naturalization is ostensibly free,285 similarly to the situation under the PNRE, the hidden 
costs of applying were in some cases prohibitively high. One estimate put the effective 
cost of applying at around 300 USD, which for many members of Group B who tend to 
work in low-paying jobs was a significant barrier.286  
Institutional Shortcomings and a Lack of Capacity 
Many problems that caused the lack of documentation among Dominicans of 
Haitian descent in the first place recurred in the implementation process and complicated 
the process for already burdened applicants. Problems with public records are endemic to 
Dominican society. According to one estimate, 60 percent of all records have errors in 
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them.287 This made for a situation where poorly trained or maliciously inclined officials 
could turn away applicants with a rightful claim to naturalization.288 Similarly, whether 
due to discrimination or poor training, some officials wrongly told applicants for 
naturalization to enter the regularization process.289 Other applicants were turned away 
with the explanation that registering required making an appointment for a specific day 
and time.290  Applicants looking to acquire the documentation necessary to apply for 
naturalization faced obstacles in dealing with hospitals. There were reports of hospitals 
refusing to hand over live birth certificates or demanding payment to do so.291 
Extralegal Requirements 
Additional documentation requirements not envisaged by the law were also 
instituted during the implementation process. Applicants were in some cases told to 
provide their mother’s birth certificate. This extralegal requirement posed yet another 
barrier for members of Group B whose mothers were no longer alive or for other reasons 
did not have access to this documentation. Even some of the applicants who did have 
access to this documentation faced problems if documents were not notarized or 
translated.292 In other instances, offices refused to accept applications that were 
incomplete despite Law 169-14 providing for 30 days to supply complementary 
documentation.293 There were also cases in which applicants were denied the opportunity 
to register because they were residents of regions other than that in which the office in 
question was located.294 
Expulsions 
 
As previously mentioned, for the duration of the regularization and naturalization 
plans, Dominican authorities instituted a moratorium on deportations. This moratorium 
was violated on several occasions in 2015 and in some cases members of both Group A 
and Group B were victims of what effectively then became expulsions. The January 27 
incident where Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian migrants were both affected is 
described in the preceding section.295 In another flagrant violation of its own policy, 
military personnel expelled Wilson Sentimo to Haiti on February 19 for not having 
identity documents.  Even when rights groups secured his return to the Dominican 
Republic the next day, Sentimo faced additional problems in the military checkpoints 
between the border town Dajabón and his hometown Libertad. It was only when 
Sentimo’s sister arrived with his birth certificate that he was able to return home but not 
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without being stopped at three checkpoints for not having identity documents beyond his 
birth certificate.296  
Sentimo’s case demonstrates the arbitrary risk of expulsion that faces Dominicans 
of Haitian descent, as despite having a birth certificate, he was still detained. Once the 
PNRE process closes, Dominican authorities are likely to repatriate the remaining 
undocumented migrants and because ethnic considerations appear to trump 
documentation, both members of Group A and Group B will be at risk of expulsion.  
 
Haitian Constitution 
Haitian Constitution of 1987 
 
Since Haiti’s founding in 1802, there have been approximately twenty-three 
versions of the Haitian Constitution.  In accordance with prevailing regional custom in 
the Americas, Haiti has historically granted citizenship based on jus soli. Additionally, 
Haiti allowed its nationals to hold dual citizenship. However in a dramatic shift from 
custom, the Constitution of 1987, adopted after the reign of Dictator Jean-Claude 
Duvalier, banned dual citizenship and adopted a strict interpretation of jus sanguinis. 
Nationality rooted in jus soli was removed from the Constitution as a political maneuver 
designed to restrict certain individuals from political office. However, the transition from 
jus soli to strict jus sanguinis has implications that have reverberated through all sectors 
of society and as demonstrated by the current crisis in the Dominican Republic, through 
time. The provisions for Haitian Nationality are enumerated under Title II Articles 10-15 
of the Haitian Constitution of 1987.297   
Migration on the island of Hispaniola is, as demonstrated by the current crisis in 
the Dominican Republic, a fact of life. Embedded in conversations on Haitian migrants 
and Dominicans of Haitian descent is the question of their ability to return to Haiti and 
claim Haitian nationality. Understanding the provisions for nationality in Haiti is of 
paramount importance for Dominicans of Haitian descent who fall under Group B of Law 
169-14. Although the members of Group B were born in the Dominican Republic, the 
law in the Dominican Republic not only views these individuals as foreigners but the 
prevailing belief within the Dominican government is that these individuals are Haitian 
citizens. In order to be regularized under the regularization plan Group B would have had 
to obtain documents from the Haitian government. The following section explores both 
the legal reality and the practical procedural implications of Dominicans of Haitian 
descent obtaining citizenship in the Dominican Republic.  
Article 11 of the Haitian Constitution of 1987 states that “any person born of a 
Haitian father or mother who are themselves native-born Haitians and have never 
renounced their nationality possesses Haitian nationality at the time of birth.”  The 
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declaration “any person born of a Haitian father and mother […]”298 signifies that Haitian 
nationality was based in jus sanguinis as opposed to the jus soli previously granted by the 
Haitian government. The jus sanguinis granted under the 1987 Constitution is restricted 
as it could only flow from parents that were native born Haitians. Furthermore, the 
parents must not have lost or renounced their nationality as enumerated by Article 13 of 
the Constitution.  This means that citizenship would not apply to those children born to 
parents belonging to a diaspora community - essentially renunciation of Haitian 
nationality was tantamount to holding citizenship in another country. Finally, Article 15 
of the 1987 Haitian Constitution declares that “dual Haitian and foreign nationality is in 
no case permitted.”299  Article 15 serves to reinforce the provision in Article 13 
underscoring that Haitian nationality is lost by naturalization in a foreign country.  
 Although the Constitution of 1987 is no longer the prevailing law as of June 19, 
2012, it is important to note that the Dominican Republic’s Constitution of 2010 (ratified 
in September 2010) coincided with the Haitian Constitution of 1987 to create a stateless 
population in the Dominican Republic despite the claims of the Constitutional Tribunal in 
Sentence 168-13. Pursuant to Article 15, which declares that no dual nationality is 
permitted, Dominicans of Haitian descent could not be eligible for Haitian nationality 
since they are Dominican citizens. The children of second or third generation Dominicans 
of Haitian descent would also have no recourse to obtaining nationality since Article 10 
of the Constitution specified that Haitian nationality could only be passed on from 
parents who are native born Haitians. As such, under the Constitution of 1987, no 
Dominican of Haitian decent could obtain Haitian nationality.  
Changes to the Haitian Constitution of 1987 
 
Before addressing the specific amendments made to the Haitian Constitution, it is 
important to emphasize that Haiti is under no obligation to provide citizenship to 
Dominicans of Haitian descent since, “international law recognizes, in principle, the 
freedom of states to regulate access to nationality as an exercise of sovereignty.”300 
Embarking on an analysis of nationality in Haiti does not imply that Haiti is responsible 
for the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic to arbitrarily 
deny citizenship to Dominicans of Haitian Descent. The purpose of this analysis is to 
clarify discussions surrounding Haitian nationality and the legal ability of Dominicans of 
Haitian descent to obtain Haitian citizenship.   
On June 19, 2012, President Michel Martelly announced amendments to the 1987 
Constitution approved by the National Parliament.301 After the 2010 earthquake, the 
steadily declining economic infrastructure in Haiti and billions of dollars in remittances 
from the diaspora community, 21.1 % of GDP in 2013,302 conversations were pursued in 
earnest exploring the value of having a diaspora community that could actively engage in 
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Haitian politics. With nearly 3 million Haitians living abroad the political salience of this 
community could no longer be ignored. The 2012 amendment of the Haitian Constitution 
represents the culmination of increasing pressure by the diaspora community with regards 
to the question of nationality.  
 The amended Haitian Constitution abrogates Articles 12(1) through Article 15. 
This means that naturalization in a foreign country does not bar one from Haitian 
nationality. In fact, the provision banning dual nationality is removed from the 
Constitution, effectively allowing any Haitian to gain nationality at the discretion of the 
Haitian Government. Although the act of granting nationality is solely at the discretion of 
the Haitian government, the new Constitution would technically allow Dominicans of 
Haitian descent to obtain Haitian nationality. Group B, who although born in the 
Dominican Republic would be required to go through the regularization process, could, if 
they so desire, apply for Haitian nationality since their parents are Haitian. However this 
technicality could only apply to first generation Dominicans of Haitian descent. Second 
and third generations of Dominicans of Haitian descent would not be covered by the 
change in the Haitian Constitution. Instead, second and third generation Dominicans of 
Haitian descent would have to be naturalized in Haiti by residing in Haiti for a 
continuous period of five years.  
 Despite the legal reality, there are glaring shortcomings in the feasibility of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent obtaining Haitian nationality.  First, the procedure for 
obtaining citizenship will be just as arduous if not more so than the process in the 
Dominican Republic considering the state of disarray of the Haitian government. In an 
analysis completed by the Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, the Canadian 
government confirms that children born abroad to a Haitian parent can apply for Haitian 
citizenship.303 However the report continues to assert that, “Haiti’s dysfunctional civil 
registry system and weak consular capacity throughout the Caribbean made obtaining 
documentation extremely difficult for individuals living inside or outside the country.”304 
The process for obtaining citizenship for children born abroad to Haitian citizens requires 
two pieces of identification for the person applying for citizenship, a foreign birth record 
and an application fee. Group B will find it nearly impossible to fulfill these requirements 
since by definition if they are members of Group B they have no proof of their birth in 
the Dominican Civil Registry. The inability to obtain a foreign birth record from the 
Dominican Republic would bar most Dominicans of Haitian descent from obtaining 
Haitian citizenship. Two other major problems that underlie the route of Haitian 
citizenship for most Dominicans are first the language barrier, since most Dominicans of 
Haitian descent speak only Spanish (languages spoken in Haiti are French and Haitian 
Creole) and second, it is at the discretion of the Haitian government to provide 
citizenship to anyone living abroad. Since the Haitian government is under no obligation 
to provide citizenship, Dominicans of Haitian descent are in no way protected from 
statelessness by the recent changes in the Haitian constitution.   
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Haitian Citizenship as an Option to Reduce Statelessness? 
 
It is a violation of the human rights of Dominicans of Haitian descent in Group B 
for the Dominican government to retroactively deny their Dominican citizenship because 
of a lack of documentation. In some instances, documents have been denied to 
Dominicans of Haitian descent based on the “presumed residency status of the bearers 
parents” or because they are considered Haitian.305 The idea that Dominicans of Haitian 
descent in Group B will be able to obtain Haitian citizenship in order to undergo the 
regularization process pursuant to Law 169-14 is false and a dangerous misinterpretation 
of Haitian law. As explained, the task of obtaining citizenship from the Haitian 
government will not prove to be easy for an already marginalized contingent of thousands 
(consider cost of travel, logistics, politics, burden of proof). Haitian citizenship is not an 
option to reduce stateless for those impacted by Law 169-14 or the laws stemming from 
Sentence 168-13. Not only is the onus on Haiti to increase efficiency in the provision of 
records in this process, there are requirements that may not be possible to fulfill for 
Dominicans of Haitian descent—most glaringly is the requirement of a foreign birth 
record. Finally, it must be underscored that even if the option to obtain Haitian 
citizenship does exist, it does not mean that Dominicans of Haitian descent will not be 
left stateless as result of Sentence 168-13.  
 
The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations 
 
Intergovernmental organizations in the Dominican Republic have worked both to 
facilitate dialogue between the governments of the Dominican Republic and Haiti and to 
educate prospective applicants on the laws. Below is a description of the work of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Organization of American States (OAS).  
International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
 
The IOM has 157 member states, including the Dominican Republic and Haiti, 
and works with the mission of “migration for the benefit of all.”306 The IOM’s mission in 
the Dominican Republic is relatively small, with fewer than 20 employees, whereas the 
mission in Haiti has upwards of 400 employees. As the IOM works specifically on 
migration, its focus is centered on the regularization process, i.e. the process that affects 
Haitian migrants.  
Following Sentence 168-13, the IOM called for a dialogue among all parties and 
organized a series of sit-downs with authorities and the international community. They 
have also provided recommendations to the Dominican government on how the law can 
be improved, including building capacity at centers to close the gap between applications 
received and applications granted. Lastly, through partner NGOs, they provide 
information to migrants on the documentation needed to apply for regularization.307  
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In 2009, the IOM worked with the Dominican government to help build a 
proposal for regularization, but after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, implementation of 
such a plan was no longer a priority. By October of 2011, the proposal was revived and 
approved. Specific to the PNRE the IOM submitted a series of recommendations, and 
some, but not all, were incorporated. One recommendation that was incorporated is the 
allowance of more forms of identification to prove residence in the Dominican Republic.  
Concerning educating the public on the processes for regularization application, 
the IOM has assisted the government in radio campaigns, providing brochures, and 
traveling to various provinces giving informational talks. Despite educational efforts, the 
IOM recognizes that few migrants have the resources, financial or otherwise, to obtain 
these documents. 
An additional barrier identified by the IOM is the low capacity of the 
regularization offices, which process 40 or less people a day. Furthermore, the offices are 
not present throughout the country, requiring migrants to travel, few of which have the 
resources to do such. In order to remedy this, the IOM hopes to work towards closing the 
gap between applications and approvals, noting that of the 120,000 migrant applications, 
only 200 have been approved.308 
United Nations Higher Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) 
 
In 2013, UNHCR pressed the Dominican Republic to restore the nationality of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent who lost their citizenship following the ruling of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. The Head of the UNHCR office in Santo Domingo, Gonzalo 
Vargas Llosa, expressed deep concern that the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal 
could leave numerous Dominicans of Haitian decent stateless, stating "It's difficult to 
imagine the devastating effect of being told that you are no longer a citizen of the country 
where you were born and lived your entire life,”309 a statement unwelcome by the 
Dominican Republic.  
In November of 2013, Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations Cesar Dargam 
Espaillat responded stating that "UNHCR is an agency of the United Nations System and 
the Dominican Republic is a part of the system, and it recognizes the agency, 
nevertheless what is now under revision is the extent of the operations that have been 
carrying out in the Dominican Republic."  
In 2014, when the Dominican Republic ushered in Law 169-14 to create a path to 
citizenship for those impacted by the previous ruling, UNHCR welcomed the 
legislation.310 However, UNHCR cites that gaps in the implementation for Law 169-14 
have created a situation that leaves many with undetermined nationality and at risk of 
statelessness. In response, UNHCR is working with at-risk populations to assure they can 
access asylum procedures in the immediate-term, and advocate for sustainable solutions 
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on the issue of statelessness, in the long-term (for more information on affected 
populations see section supra on the implementation of the Naturalization Plan).311  
Organization of American States (OAS) 
 
The Santo Domingo office of the OAS works as a liaison between the Dominican 
government and its 34 other member states. The organization works to promote human 
rights, multinational security, development and democracy.  
In addition to working as a liaison, the OAS has attempted to assist the Haitian 
government to provide identification cards to Haitians living in the Dominican 
Republic.312 Unfortunately, the Haitian government did not provide a definitive response 
to the offer of assistance, only indicating that the offer was under review.313 The OAS 
feels that this program could have assisted greatly in providing Haitian migrants with the 
documentation necessary for the regularization process.314 While the window of 
opportunity for OAS assistance with this identification project has closed, the OAS is 
currently developing a new offer of assistance to help the Haitian government strengthen 
its National Identity Office and procedures. 315  Both the Haitian and Dominican 
governments should involve the OAS in future identification programs due to its wealth 
of expertise and capacity to provide targeted resources. 
According to Araceli Azuara Ferreiro, the Organization of the American States 
(OAS) Representative in the Dominican Republic, the most important obstacle to 
managing migration issues, in general, is the inaccurate public perception of migrants.316 
Given this general principle, it is unlikely that the Dominican Republic will find a good 
solution on the issue of migration until there is a societal change in how migrants, 
especially Haitian migrants, are perceived.317  
 
Civil Society Stakeholders 
Civil Society 
 
Freedom of assembly is generally respected in the Dominican Republic, with the 
right to form civic groups upheld by the government. Many civil society organizations in 
the Dominican Republic are considered well organized and efficient.318 Throughout the 
implementation of the PNRE and Law 169-14 various civil society organizations have 
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worked to assist applicants in understanding and navigating the regularization and 
naturalization processes. Many organizations have expressed concern, and noted 
difficulties regarding the wording and implementation of the laws. Below are two 
noteworthy organizations, the Batey Relief Alliance and MENAMIRD that are working 
to assist both Dominicans of Haitian decent and Haitian migrants in the regularization 
and naturalization processes.  
Batey Relief Alliance 
 
The Batey Relief Alliance, located in Santo Domingo, is a non-political, non-
profit organization working to provide humanitarian assistance to people living in 
bateyes.319 The alliance works to help meet the needs of both Haitians and Dominicans 
living in poverty, but the implementation of the PNRE and Law 169-14 has increased the 
need to focus on documentation issues, as many of their beneficiaries of Haitian descent 
are being denied services.  
The Batey Relief Alliance has since worked to assist many of their beneficiaries 
reclaim citizenship. Specifically they have partnered with UNICEF to help educate 
people on the law. Initially they identified who was at risk for deportation, and who 
among that group had the ability to gain the required documents. They have assisted 
roughly 500 people from 6 bateyes.320  
During the course of meeting with the Batey Relief Alliance, the organization 
identified several obstacles that they have encountered in assisting beneficiaries in the 
naturalization process. First, documentation of birth from Dominican hospitals is often 
misplaced or lost. Secondly, the offices responsible for processing documentation claims 
have been slow to process applications. Thirdly, transportation to and from the offices is 
difficult and expensive, creating high costs for individuals to collect required documents. 
Lastly, the Batey Relief Alliance pointed to the fact that several generations have since 
been born on the bateyes and, similar to their parents, were never provided 
documentation of birth despite being born in the Dominican Republic.321  
Mesa Nacional para las Migraciones y Refugiados en República Dominicana 
(MENAMIRD)   
 
MENAMIRD is a coordination-focused organization located in Santo Domingo, 
with 36 member-institutions and 47 member-churches. Their main purpose is to defend 
the human rights of migrants. During the course of a meeting with members of 
MENAMIRD, several workers told both personal and cliental experiences of applying for 
documentation. One individual, who works with a local church, stated that 80% of the 
people there have been unable to register for the regularization process, mainly due to 
transportation costs to travel to an application center. Additionally he cited corruption 
and a lack of available lawyers as barriers to application. Several others present at this 
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meeting agreed that both corruption and a lack of legal assistance were barriers to citizens 
trying to access documentation.  
Another issue cited is the fact that the law often requires documentation from 
Haiti.  Given structural issues in Haiti, obtaining such documentation has proven 
extremely difficult. According to MENAMIRD, in January 2015 36,000 people had 
requested documents from the Haitian government but only 3,000 had received them.  
Additionally, one speaker pointed to the elderly living on bateyes, estimated to be 
roughly 22,000 people, who have now lost access to pensions as a result of their 
citizenship being rescinded. MENAMIRD is petitioning the government for an exception 
to stringent rules requiring documents such as birth certificates, which many of the aging 
batey residents do not possess.  
Furthermore, MENAMIRD pointed to the systematic lack of documentation 
provided by both the Dominican Republic and Haiti governments as a main problem 
underlying migration and citizenship in the two countries. MENAMIRD supports the 
PNRE because it addresses this underlying problem by providing people a pathway to 
some type of documentation. Lastly, MENAMIRD claims that deportation has already 
begun, pointing to one specific example, which included 22 people being sent across the 
border in the town of Neiba.  
MENAMIRD has been undertaking several tasks to assist beneficiaries 
throughout the implementation of the PNRE and Law 169-14. First, they have provided 
translators at different registration centers; second, they have explained the laws to 
people looking to register; and third, they have advocated for European notaries to 
accompany people to and from offices. Furthermore, they have helped to create a 
network of community activists and served as an intermediary between the governments 
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.322  
Legal Community  
 
Jorge Prats, a constitutional scholar and co-author of the most recent Dominican 
Constitution, asserts that Law 169-14 is strong in writing, but has been implemented 
poorly. Currently there are many citizens in the Dominican Republic who are not able to 
access their rights as a result of this poor implementation, including low capacity of the 
centers and a lack of legal assistance.323 Although the legal community is less active on 
this issue than civil society, there are a few organizations working to legally assist those 
that have lost their citizenship.  Documented below are the efforts of Centro Bonó.  
Centro Bonó 
 
Centro Bonó is a Jesuit organization that advocates for minorities and the 
oppressed in coordination with the Catholic Church. Specifically they accompany 
affected individuals through the legal system, acting as an advocate and providing legal 
assistance. In working to advocate around the PNRE and Law 169-14, Centro Bonó 
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identifies key test cases that are most likely to succeed in tribunals. From 2010-2012 they 
won all of their tribunals, however, the federal government refused to implement any of 
these rulings.  Centro Bonó has also supported peaceful demonstrations and marches, 
which works towards their goal of raising awareness of the issue. They also feel their 
efforts are humanizing the controversy by showing the public the faces of those impacted. 
Through the combination of lawyers’ efforts and victims’ stories, Centro Bonó hopes 
their efforts will help to transform society. 
Concerning recommendations that could be made to the law, Centro Bonó points 
to the fact that application of Law 169-14 is very different from the text of the law, 
specifically implementation is a more rigorous process. Additionally there is a problem 
with capacity; government offices are only able to process roughly 40 people a day as 
discussed in the previous implementation section on the PNRE. Lastly, Centro Bonó 
believes the issue is one of race and anti-racism campaigns need to take place to spur 
change.324  
Improving Access to Legal Assistance 
 
The American Bar Association – Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) received a 
grant by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 
in September 2014 to “boost legal assistance and protection for stateless persons in the 
Dominican Republic.”325 Through the program, ABA ROLI, has partnered with two civil 
society organization in the Dominican Republic, the Red de Jesuitas con Migrantes and 
Centro de Formación y Acción Social y Agraria (CEFASA), to “enhance legal 
professionals’ and local organizations’ capacity to provide legal assistance, conduct 
outreach activities to inform stateless persons of their rights and help to expand access to 
free legal services.”326 
There is limited access to legal assistance for individuals applying to the 
naturalization or regularization processes. Completion of either process will be extremely 
difficult without legal guidance to applicants, given the complexity of the laws and 
requirements. Therefore, it is important that more legal services extend pro bono 
guidance to those pursuing documentation. The assistance of service oriented legal clinics 
conducted by Dominican law students would be one option that provides invaluable 
assistance to applicants, legal experience to students, and promotes a culture of pro bono 
activity within the legal community.  Without this, and additional forms of assistance, the 
number of individuals able to successfully complete the application process will remain 
low.  
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Freedom of the Press 
 
Amongst the sources of media available in the Dominican Republic, there are 
over 50 newspapers327 and more than 200 radio stations that are mostly commercial, as 
well as many local and cable television stations.328  There are also three daily newspapers 
– El Caribe, Hoy and Dario Libre, and Dominican Today – that publish Dominican news 
in English.  Concerning public ownership of media outlets, the Dominican government 
owns a state TV and radio that is frequently broadcasted through the state TV channel, 
Corporación Estatal de Radio y Televisión (CERTV).329  However, although freedom of 
press is guaranteed, according to Freedom House,330 the Dominican Republic scored a 
press status “Partly Free” meaning that civil liberties are moderately protected. Even 
though Dominican law allows for freedom of speech, both public and private actors can 
and do ignore this guarantee by intimidating the press.331 The biggest concern expressed 
by Freedom House is the extensive defamation law in the Dominican Republic that 
hinders press freedom. If journalists, editors, or vendors are found guilty of defamation, 
they can be punished with fines or jail time.332 This hinders freedom of the press. 
Anti-Haitian sentiment has created a dangerous environment for human rights 
defenders.  Journalists have been threatened in public places for advocating for 
Dominicans of Haitian descent.  Four journalists in the Dominican Republic have filed 
lawsuits against an outspoken nationalist who threatened them for covering the 
citizenship and immigration debate.333  Amnesty International has called for urgent action 
on this issue.334 Dominican officials are investigating the allegations regarding the four 
journalists that were threatened.  However, they released the man accused of threatening 
the journalists.  The Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, and the 
Caribbean Institute for Human Rights will file a petition on behalf of these four 
journalists with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.335  When journalists 
fear for their lives, freedom of speech is impeded because journalists cannot continue to 
inform the public.336 The Dominican government should take these allegations seriously 
in order for journalists to feel safe enough to continue reporting on the rights of Haitian 
migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent. 
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Media Campaign to Advertise the Processes 
 
The Dominican Republic’s media campaign on the PNRE and Law 169-14 was 
not robust enough in informing and educating the public on the different processes. On 
May 15, 2014, José Ramón Fadul, the Minister of Interior and Police and the National 
Immigration Council (CNM) president announced that there would be a media campaign 
“‘so that people are informed as to where they should go and have guarantees that it’s not 
a call to regularize to produce irregular or abusive deportations or disrespect to of the 
dignity of human beings.’”337  The PNRE, however, was already well underway before 
this media campaign was even announced by Minister Fadul.   
As stated above, media campaigns to advertise the naturalization process were not 
successful. In October 2014, the State Representative for the Dominican Republic at the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights hearing on the Progress and Challenges 
posed by Law 169-14 in the Dominican Republic spoke of the advertising campaigns that 
the Dominican government had developed to present the naturalization plans to the 
public.338  This awareness campaign included using the radio, newspapers, brochures, 
working groups, and megaphone announcements in areas with a high concentration of 
immigrants.  However, these media campaigns were delayed and their effectiveness 
questionable. 
The IOM in the Dominican Republic, which provides information on the 
government’s plans and translation services for migrants to apply for the processes, 
believe that the Dominican government’s efforts to increase public awareness were not as 
effective as they could be and that the radio campaign had little effect in accessing 
information on these programs.339  The Batey Relief Alliance stated that “the government 
did not do a massive promotion of the new law, they made some pamphlets and such but 
the majority of the publication was done by UNHCR who had the program that we 
participated in.  Outside of that there wasn't that much information for the general 
public.”340 The lack of clear and transparent information on these procedures due to the 
weak use of media in promoting the process could have contributed to the low numbers 
of people successfully applying. Many people have to travel far to reach an office 
handling regularization before they are turned away because of missing documents and 
have to make the costly trip back home.341 
There are many ways in which the Dominican Republic’s media could have 
helped the citizens in clarifying the two different processes for regularization and 
naturalization. The media could have disseminated the correct information on the 
government’s regularization and naturalization processes and reported on news stories to 
the domestic and international media.  In order to portray accurate information, the media 
should check the credibility of sources.  The media outlets could have joined forces with 
civil society in order to educate the public on these laws and application processes. 
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All media outlets should continue to report on all issues regarding the processes 
of regularization and naturalization in the Dominican Republic as well as the effects of 
these new processes and laws. Domestic media outlets should also reach out to 
international media and collaborate on reporting to share news with the international 
community regarding the implementation of these laws in the Dominican Republic. The 
media will also obtain more information to report on by collaborating with civil society 
and will be a stronger advocate for the community. The Dominican Republic’s media 
sector has an obligation to the people who read, watch, and listen to their information. 




The criteria of the regularization and naturalization plans make it difficult for 
Haitian migrants to obtain documentation and effectively strips Dominicans of Haitian 
descent of citizenship, which in turn creates a large population of undocumented workers.  
Haitian migrants comprise a large percentage of workers in the Dominican Republic’s 
key industries – construction, agriculture and tourism 342– and many Haitian migrants 
work informally in these sectors.  Undocumented workers are vulnerable to labor 
exploitation, amongst other things, as a result of the lack of documentation.  The private 
sector cannot turn a blind eye on issues that affect their supply chain.343  This section 
aims to illustrate the problems that undocumented workers face in the private sector.      
Dominicans of Haitian Descent and Haitian migrant workers are mostly in low-
skilled occupations that are physically demanding and dangerous.344  Eighty percent of 
workers in major agricultural sectors in the Dominican Republic are Haitian migrants 
affected by the regularization law.345  Many Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian 
descent lack national identification cards and some have no proof of their birthplace.  
Specifically, this lack of identification makes them vulnerable to exploitation and 
impedes their access to social services such as health and education while also making it 
difficult for them to work in the formal sector.  Some Dominicans of Haitian descent with 
proper documentation have been able to work in the formal sectors as low-paying nurses, 
construction workers, and household cleaners; however, until most recently, Dominicans 
of Haitian descent have had increased difficulty accessing updated documents.   
The Dominican Labor Code illustrates certain labor laws that affect 
undocumented workers in the Dominican Republic.  According to the Dominican Labor 
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Code,346 every worker who is performing paid work within the boundaries of the 
Dominican Republic has rights regardless of their nationality.347  Thus, undocumented 
persons still retain rights, which extend to their rights as workers. 
The Dominican Labor Code has regulations that are linked to how businesses 
regard the regularization and naturalization plans.348  Businesses in the Dominican 
Republic need to adhere to the 80/20 law.  Article 138 of the Dominican Labor Code 
states that at least 80% of a company’s employees must be Dominican, thus at least 80% 
of the payroll (aside from technical and executive salaries) must be wages earned by 
Dominicans (Art. 136).349  Contracts are an important tool for Haitian migrant workers 
applying for the PNRE, as such paperwork could prove the duration of their residency in 
the Dominican Republic.  However, the Dominican Labor Code (Art. 19) does not state 
that the contract has to be written; while written agreements are recommended, verbal 
contracts are technically valid.350  Haitian migrant workers are at a particular 
disadvantage because their contracts can legally be verbal contracts, and companies may 
not have kept a record of these agreements.  Therefore, their petition to prove the 
duration of their residence in the Dominican Republic and to obtain legal status is even 
more difficult.351   
In addition, verbal contracts give employers the power to abuse undocumented 
workers. In particular, there have been allegations that if the Haitian migrants complain, 
the employers take a defensive posture and accuse the workers of causing problems; even 
though the employers are exploiting the undocumented worker’s labor to start.352  Given 
the above, employers should provide written labor contracts to protect workers’ rights 
and ensure that there is documentation in place to apply for processes such as the PNRE.   
The 80/20 law brings the issue of nationality into the workplace.  Businesses need 
to make sure that their workforce comprises of at least 80% Dominican citizens.  Since 
the citizenship rights of Dominicans of Haitian descent are at risk, businesses may need 
to reevaluate the percentage of Dominicans their companies actually employ under the 
Dominican Labor Code.  This may result in further problems for Dominicans of Haitian 
descent because they will not be seen as Dominicans and will possibly be fired from their 
jobs in order for companies to adhere to the 80/20 law.  As for Haitian migrants, this 
population is usually also undocumented and they are not formally calculated into the 
80/20 ratio of workers in businesses.353  In some industries, the reality is that 
undocumented workers account for 80% of the business.354  Thus, businesses that employ 
a majority of undocumented workers who qualify for the regularization plan may not be 
willing to provide documentation to assist those workers, since it would categorize those 
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workers as foreigners and not be calculated as part of the required 80% of Dominican 
citizens in the workforce. 
Considering the Dominican Labor Code, Dominican businesses may take 
advantage of the vulnerable situation of undocumented workers.  Although every paid 
worker in the Dominican Republic has rights regardless of their nationality, in reality, 
undocumented people either do not know they have employment rights or are not offered 
these employment rights and can be easily exploited and abused in the work place.355  
This problem is also created by undocumented workers inability to join a union.  It is a 
requirement for union participants to have a Dominican identity card in order to be a 
member.356  Thus, undocumented workers do not have a way to voice their grievances in 
a union or to access the resources a union has available to educate members on their 
rights.  As a result, in practice, undocumented workers have fewer rights and can be 
employed for lower wages than allowed by the Dominican Labor Law.  For example, 
Dominican construction contractors prefer hiring Haitian workers because “their 
precarious legal status makes them more flexible and willing to accept exploitative 
conditions and less likely to know their rights and be able to claim them.”357  Employers 
deliberately hire undocumented workers; these workers are easier to control and will 
work under harsher conditions because it is harder to find a job in the formal sector 
without the documentation to apply for a work permit.358  
In addition to an undocumented worker’s inability to join a union without a 
cédula, undocumented workers also face obstacles when they wish to cash their 
paycheck.359  Without documents, it takes these laborers longer to cash a check.  In 
addition, the amount that an undocumented worker receives on a paycheck may also be 
less than expected since they have difficulty in accessing social benefits.  Employers 
withhold a percentage of an employee’s check for health insurance.360 However, 
undocumented workers cannot access the insurance system without a Dominican identity 
card, and therefore, they are paying into a fund without receiving the benefits.361  It is 
possible that their employers deduct a percentage from undocumented workers’ 
paychecks because they are not formally on a payroll and employers keep this percentage 
for themselves since the undocumented workers cannot access these funds.362  
Without documents, workers do not have a sense of job security.  The 
undocumented workers are threatened and abused by employers,363 and they also feel 
uncertain about their future with a lingering fear of deportation.  In one case, a nurse who 
was born in the Dominican Republic but has Haitian parents was fired from her job 
because she was born at home and lacked official paperwork.364  She has lived in the 
Dominican Republic her entire life and may be expulsed to Haiti because she does not 
have a Dominican birth certificate.  This is an example where a Dominican of Haitian 
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descent will not be able to make a living in the country in which he or she was born and 
possibly be expulsed to a country that they have no connection to.  In the case of Juliana 
Dequis, discussed previously, she could not obtain documentation to apply for a national 
identification.  She believes she was subsequently fired by her employers as a maid 
because she brought her case forward and thus notoriety to the attention of the 
community.365 
A Haitian migrant’s livelihood is dependent on their employer’s goodwill.  New 
regulation requires Dominican employers to obtain temporary visas for migrants workers; 
however, whether the employer actually does so is uncertain.366  The employer has the 
power to grant undocumented employees their pay, medical services, and legal 
assistance.  It is up to the employer’s discretion whether or not they wish to certify who 
their employees are in order to prove residence in the Dominican Republic to gain a 
regular status. Thus, employers should comply with the laws themselves, by assisting 
applicants with the naturalization and regularization processes, and operating in a lawful 
business manner in the Dominican Republic in legally accounting for employees. 
According to Araceli Azuara Ferreiro, Dominican businessmen support Sentence 
168-13 for two reasons. First, labor is even cheaper if workers are not regularized and 
there is no need to pay for healthcare or social security benefits;367 and second, as 
mentioned previously, according to Dominican labor law, eighty percent of the workers 
in a given company need to be Dominican.  However, in reality the opposite is true.  
Thus, Dominican employers refuse to give Haitian migrants a certificate validating their 
work in the country for fear of being penalized with fines.368 
While undocumented workers may benefit businesses in certain circumstances, 
businesses also face certain disadvantages by operating in such unpredictable 
environments.  Undocumented workers affect the productivity and profits of a business 
because governments can deport a business’ undocumented workers and fine 
noncompliant businesses for hiring workers without valid work permits.369  In addition, 
the company will incur further costs considering the risk and unpredictability of the 
number of workers that are able to work; since the Dominican government will use 
deportation to regulate the problem of undocumented people, businesses risk the sudden 
loss of their employees.370  There is an incentive for companies to have a consistent and 
reliable work force, and thus, they should help their undocumented employees gain a 
regular status.   However, if that benefit does not exceed the cost of having to pay for 
their social benefits, for the cost of possible penalization for not following the 80/20 rule, 
or for hiring undocumented workers, the company may not wish to help their employees 
by providing them with proper documentation. 
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The lack of documentation also has a tremendous negative impact on child labor.  
Although Article 56 of the 2010 Constitution declares the fight against child labor as a 
national priority,371 the lack of documentation creates potential child labor problems for 
businesses.  Thirteen percent of all children younger than 15 years of age have no birth 
documents.372  This lack of documentation also means that employers have no formal 
method to verify a child’s age in order to adhere to Article 17 of the Labor Code.373   
In the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – a 
voluntary set of principles – Pillar 2 states that there is a corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights.374  Although the UN Guiding Principles are voluntary, consumers 
and NGOs expect corporate social responsibility progress reports from businesses.  This 
means that all businesses in the Dominican Republic should ensure that their workers 
have the protection of contracts and that their working conditions meet the standards of 
international law.  
 The Dominican government is pressured by such entities as the Dominican 
Republic- Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) to 
improve its Labor Code.  The Public Report of Review of U.S. Submission 2011-03375 
submitted by the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs of the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
Bureau of International Affairs recommends that the Dominican government enforce the 
Dominican Republic’s Labor Code according to CAFTA-DR.  The Public Report also 
recommends that the Dominican government strengthen laws that allow workers who are 
eligible to have social security benefits deducted from their paychecks.  This would 
eliminate the issue of workers involuntarily paying into a fund that they cannot access. 
Furthermore, the Public Report recommends a better grievance mechanism to enable 
workers to formally voice their opinions to the authorities regarding workplace issues 
without fear of deportation.376 
This Public Report is one of many that illustrate the business environment in the 
Dominican Republic.  There are many “Doing Business in the Dominican Republic” 
reports published by a variety of entities, such as The World Bank Group,377 
PricewaterhouseCoopers,378 consulting groups,379 and law firms.380  The Public Report 
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affirms the Dominican Republic’s government’s failure to enforce labor laws under the 
CAFTA-DR trade agreement.  Although the Public Report’s recommendations are 
directed at the Dominican government regarding a trade agreement, businesses need to be 
aware of all the risks that their companies could face if the Dominican government 
chooses to investigate these violations to the CAFTA-DR labor issues. 
The Dominican Republic is taking multiple steps in promoting economic growth 
in the country, which includes engaging with the private sector to improve the investment 
climate in the Dominican Republic.381  Given this emphasis, the Dominican Republic 
government and the private sector share an interest in promoting a business-friendly 
environment.  However, the current situation regarding Haitian migrants and Dominicans 
of Haitian descent conflicts with that interest.  The uncertainty regarding the status of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian migrants, as well as human rights concerns 
about these populations, will not make the Dominican Republic a business-friendly 
environment.   
Large businesses that have a brand reputation to protect prefer to invest in 
countries that have clear and transparent rules regarding labor. The Dominican Republic, 
like many developing nations, wants to attract foreign investors, and the Dominican 
business community has the opportunity to make a difference by showing the public how 
Haitians contribute to the economic development of the Dominican Republic.382  
Fundación Zile is an organization that capitalizes on the substantial contribution of 
Haitian migrants to the Dominican economy as a means to preserve peace between the 
two nationalities living within and outside of the island.383  In addition, Fundación Zile is 
working on a project to promote social responsibility within Dominican companies.384  
This demonstrates that there is a case for businesses to make a conscientious effort to 
help undocumented workers obtain identification documents. Unfortunately, as discussed 
above, Dominican businesses also have motivations not to help undocumented workers. 
Businesses should understand that they are not immune to the problems of 
undocumented people in the Dominican Republic.  Although businesses are not obligated 
to implement the government regulations protecting undocumented workers, they can 
assist these workers in gaining the necessary certifications such as proof of residency in 
the Dominican Republic in order to proceed with the regularization process.  In addition 
to easing both naturalization and regularization processes and providing the necessary 
documentation to undocumented workers, businesses can partner with non-profit 
organizations, government organizations, and other civil society actors to collaborate and 
ease those processes for them to obtain national identification documents. 
Businesses have the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  The 
international corporations’ headquarters of companies operating in the Dominican 
Republic should publically take a human rights stance against Sentence 168-13.  
International businesses should ensure that their suppliers and partners in the Dominican 
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Republic have the proper mechanisms in place to respect human rights, especially those 
of the undocumented population.  
 
Bilateral Relations   
Dominican Republic – Haiti Relations 
  
 While Haiti has continued to rebuild infrastructure and institutions following the 
January 12, 2010 earthquake, the government does not possess the institutional capacity 
to fulfill the requests for passports coming in from Haitian migrants in the Dominican 
Republic.  Since 2010, agricultural production has been negatively impacted by droughts, 
pests and multiple hurricanes that have hit Haiti.  Additionally, international donor 
financing has decreased in the last three years, a trend that is forecasted to continue in the 
future.  This lack of financing limits Haiti’s capital investments, making institution-
building efforts more difficult.  The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, 59% of 
Haitians live below the national poverty line, and there is a large gap in wealth between 
the rich and poor.385  With mounting internal problems, the Haitian government lacks the 
time, labor force, and infrastructure to respond in a timely manner to the needs of Haitian 
migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent.  
 Due to these obstacles faced by the Haitian government, requests for documents 
from Haiti have not been processed in a timely manner.  According to MENAMIRD, the 
Haitian Embassy in the Dominican Republic requires roughly five months and up to one 
year to process requests.  MENAMIRD has been working with the Haitian government to 
reduce the cost of documents to 1,000 Pesos (approximately 22 USD) for the necessary 
PNRE documents, but the organization emphasizes the difficulty caused by structural 
issues in Haiti.  They assert that out of 36,000 people who have requested documents 
from the Haitian government, only 3,000 have received the necessary papers to apply for 
regularization.  This delayed turn-around time has prohibited many Haitian migrants and 
Dominicans of Haitian descent from applying to the PNRE.386 
 In order to assist with documentation requests, the OAS offered to aid the Haitian 
government by providing free identification cards to Haitians in the Dominican Republic 
so that they could proceed with the regularization process.387  Since the Haitian 
government charges for documents, in addition to the costs incurred by migrants 
traveling from the Dominican Republic to Haiti, this plan would have assisted many 
Haitian migrants in attaining their documents.  Unfortunately, the Haitian government did 
not provide a definitive answer to the OAS offer of assistance, only indicating that the 
project was under review.388  However, the situation may change with a new Haitian 
government.389  Indeed, a new OAS project is under development to assist the Haitian 
government to strengthen the National Identity Office and its procedures.390 These offers 
of technical assistance present great opportunities to cure the lack of documentation.  As 
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such, the Haitian government should collaborate with the OAS on such opportunities to 
provide documentation to Haitian citizens.  Yet it should be emphasized that, in the 
interim, a timely resolution to providing documentation to Haitian citizens is essential 
given the short timeframe to regularize in the Dominican Republic. 
 According to the IOM, the burden of regularization is shared between both Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic after years of unregulated migration.  The IOM recommends 
that the countries should work together through the government, civil society, and the 
international community for a solution.  They also emphasize the complexity of 
citizenship laws and how states recognize nationality.391  Haiti’s Constitution of 2012, 
Title II, Article 11 does not allow jus soli but instead requires that a Haitian citizen must 
be Haitian born while also having at least one Haitian parent.392  Because the Haitian 
Constitution requires aspects of both jus soli and jus sanguinis, Dominicans of Haitian 
descent who do not have the documents for naturalization in the Dominican Republic, are 
at risk of statelessness.  In order to resolve these multifaceted challenges, a united 
bilateral stance between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is required.    
 Compounding already difficult bilateral relations, on June 8, 2013, Haiti instituted 
an import ban on Dominican poultry and eggs.  The Haitian government, normally 
possessing the most liberal tariff regime in the region, claimed that there was a risk of 
bird flu.  Since the Haitian economy relies heavily on agriculture, this policy proved 
popular with farmers.393  However, this ban on Dominican poultry and eggs contributed 
to weakening bilateral relations.  On January 16, 2014, Haiti lifted the ban, but residual 
damage still exists between the two countries, exacerbating the current situation.394 
 Bilateral relations would be further impacted by deportations that occur due to the 
implementation of the PNRE and Law 169-14.  In addition to Amnesty International 
reports, human rights groups such as the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 
Human Rights have reported that some Dominicans of Haitian descent, as well as Haitian 
migrants were already expulsed to Haiti while they were attempting to obtain 
documentation in the Dominican Republic. As discussed earlier in this report, victims 
include both children and adults who are being deported from their country of birth to 
one they may have never before visited.395  Dominican authorities have said they will 
recommence deportations in June for anyone who has not yet completed the 
naturalization or regularization processes.396  Due to Haiti’s constitutional citizenship 
requirements, thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent risk statelessness if they are 
expulsed to their country of ancestral origin with which they may have no cultural or 
current familial ties. 
 In addition to the human rights concern, an influx of repatriated persons to Haiti, 
including many stateless refugees, would have a destabilizing effect on Haiti’s uncertain 
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economy.  With the lowest income per capita in the Western hemisphere at 852 USD, 
Haiti would have difficulty absorbing so many refugees and former migrants.397  This 
abject poverty, intensified by an unemployment rate of 40.6%, would be exacerbated by 
an incoming vulnerable population.  Presently, more than two-thirds of Haiti’s labor force 
does not have formal work; the country is unable to aid its own citizens and is 
particularly ill-equipped to assist arriving refugees.398   
 Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been holding high-level talks on 
immigration since 2013 in an effort to resolve the dissent and conflict that emerged after 
Sentence 168-13.  Recognizing that the causes of immigration are shared between both 
countries, the governments created a high-level, bilateral commission to discuss 
migration, commerce, and the environment.  Despite numerous disagreements that led to 
the breakdown of multiple rounds of talks, the commission has endured through 2015.  
The latest round of talks, in March 2015, included representatives from the EU and the 
UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH.  In order to make constructive progress 
toward a resolution that respects the human rights of all parties, continued discussion in 
search of a bilateral solution is essential.399 
 Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic play an important role in remedying the 
current immigration situation.  Improved bilateral relations and communication between 
countries would significantly aid the Haitian government in providing documents while 
pushing the Dominican government to allow an extended timeframe for regularization.  
Moving forward from historical clashes and current disputes will prove difficult, but it is 
an important step to improve human rights for the many Haitian migrants and 
Dominicans of Haitian descent living in the Dominican Republic. 
The Role of the United States 
 
The United States is in a particularly strong position to influence the Dominican 
Republic’s immigration law and policy through sanctions and diplomatic pressure 
because of its strong soft, economic, and political power in the Dominican Republic. For 
example, a 2012 Gallup Poll showed Dominicans overwhelmingly approve of U.S. global 
leadership with 57% of Dominicans approving, 8% disapproving and 35% uncertain—
this represents the third highest rating for any surveyed country in the Americas.400  In 
addition to the positive perception the U.S. enjoys in the Dominican Republic, the U.S. 
Embassy estimates that 100,000 U.S. citizens live in the Dominican Republic (many of 
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them dual nationals) and more than 1.5 million individuals of Dominican origin reside in 
the United States, most of them in the metropolitan Northeast and Florida.401 
Similarly, the U.S. also enjoys a strong economic linkage with the Dominican 
Republic. The United States is one of the Dominican Republic’s most important trading 
partners, 48.8% of all Dominican exports are sent to the United States and 43.6% of all 
imports to Dominican Republic come from the United States.402 In 2013, bilateral trade 
between the two countries was estimated at $11.42 billion, and 70% of the share of 
consumer goods imported to the Dominican Republic is from the U.S.403 In addition, the 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Dominican Republic was estimated at 
$148.1 million in 2013, roughly $60 million of which came from the United States.404 
These economic linkages are only poised to grow as the free trade agreement, CAFTA-
DR, which facilitates trade and investment among the seven member-countries, is better 
implemented.405 
The U.S. has two major security initiatives with the Dominican Republic: the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Merida Initiative. Under the CBSI, 
which provides assistance for law enforcement, citizen safety, and rule of law programs 
throughout the hemisphere, the U.S. has committed $263 million in funding since 
2010.406 The Merida Initiative is a multi-year security agreement between the 
governments of the United States, Mexico, the nations of Central America, the 
Dominican Republic, and Haiti to combat violence and organized crime within these 
countries. Under this initiative, the U.S. Congress allocated $2.5 million to the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti each.407 
All these investments in trade, humanitarian aid, and security partnerships, 
indicate that a democratic, stable, and economically healthy Dominican Republic is in the 
U.S.’ best interest.408 The State Department and USAID, in their Joint Strategic Goal 
Framework FY2014-2017, concluded that one of their five strategic goals through 2017 
is to “Protect core U.S. interests by advancing democracy and human rights and 
strengthening civil society.”409 Unfortunately, the U.S. response to the Constitutional 
Tribunal ruling, 168-13, which threatens human rights, economic, and democratic 
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development in the Dominican Republic, has consisted mainly of quiet diplomacy, or 
meetings behind closed doors to express its disapproval and concerns. Despite 
international outcry, the U.S. did not make an official condemnation or public statement 
against the September ruling until 3 months later on December 18th. In response to a 
question, a U.S. State Department spokesperson issued the following statement: 
 
“We’ve conveyed our deep concern to the Government of the Dominican 
Republic regarding the ruling’s impact on the citizenship status of persons 
in the Dominican Republic, the majority of which, as you mentioned, are 
of Haitian descent.  We’ve urged the government to continue close 
consultation with international partners and civil society to identify and 
expeditiously address in a humane way concerns regarding the plan’s 
scope and reach to affected persons.  So we’ll continue the dialogue, but 
we have expressed our concerns over it.”410 
 
Another way the U.S. assists and contributes to improving the situation of Haitian 
migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic is by funding the 
leading international migration organizations, UNHCR and the IOM. In fact, the U.S. is 
the single largest donor to both UNHCR and the IOM. This is pivotal because the IOM 
played an important advisory role to the Dominican government on the implementation 
of the PNRE and, in the case of the sentence, IOM called for dialogue. The IOM has also 
given recommendations, in coordination with United Nations Country team, to Law 169-
14, in addition to the PNRE. 
While the U.S. goals are wide and diverse ranging from combatting human 
trafficking and government capacity building to better prevent and protect irregular 
migrants, border management and anti-forgery, to support voluntary return of Haitian 
migrants,411 the U.S. has nonetheless provided funding to the IOM to help with technical 
support and to accompany applicants. 
The Department of State also supports UNHCR and its efforts to assist the 
Dominican Republic and other Caribbean countries in developing a better system for 
determining the refugee status of asylum seekers, of which Haitians are a large 
percentage.412 However, resistance from the Dominican government has undercut 
UNHCR’s efforts and only a few resettlement cases have been adjudicated since the 
Dominican Republic’s refugee eligibility committee (CONARE) first met in June 
2012.413 As of yet, all cases to come before the committee have been rejected.414 
The U.S. State Department has two additional projects to build capacity and 
provide technical and legal support to both the Dominican government and applicants 
needing assistance—one with the Heartland Alliance and another with ABA ROLI. 
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Despite these efforts and especially considering the tremendous U.S. potential for 
effecting positive change in the Dominican Republic, the U.S. could and should do more. 
Therefore, the U.S. should place economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic in order 
to improve its dismal human rights track record and address the issue of potential 
statelessness. 
Economic sanctions from the U.S. would send a clear and strong message to the 
Dominican Republic that its actions are unacceptable, would warn potential future 
offenders that sanctions are on the table, and would demonstrate that the U.S. stands 
ready to protect its core values and interests.415 And the precedent is there, from 1914-
2000, the U.S. imposed sanctions 28 different times with the goal of forcing a target 
country to improve its human rights violations. Studies show that these sanctions are 
effective and achievable because of their relatively small and more narrowly defined 
foreign policy objectives.416  
Furthermore, results of past sanctions indicate that the odds for a successful 
outcome are higher when exactly the same conditions in the case of the Dominican 
Republic are present: the sender country is larger than the target country in economic 
terms; trade and financial flows between the sender and target are high; the sender is able 
to attract international cooperation; and the economic costs of defiance are higher to the 
target country than compliance with the what the sender country is requesting. 417 The 
Peterson Institute concluded that among all economic sanctions imposed for modest 
policy changes, including human rights corrections, 50% made progress in achieving its 
goals and that greater trade linkages increased the likelihood of success in the case of 
modest changes like human rights. Thus, imposing economic sanctions to promote 
human rights is a policy that should not be dismissed as out of hand and needs to be 
thoroughly explored. One case worth recounting is that of U.S. sanctions on Chile. 
From 1975-1990 the U.S. placed sanctions on Chile to improve human rights and 
restore democracy. According to the Peterson Institute this policy was successful, 
meaning that the goal of improved human rights and democracy was achieved and that 
sanctions contributed either modestly or decisively to this improvement.418 The present 
conditions in the Dominican Republic are similar to the conditions Chile faced at the time 
sanctions were imposed i.e. stronger economic linkage and a more favorable U.S.-to-DR 
GDP ratio. It is likely that sanctions imposed on the Dominican Republic would to lead to 
results even more successful.419 
Placing economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic would not be a first. The 
U.S. placed economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic from 1960-1962—in the 
form of a limited trade embargo and a 2-cents per pound of sugar import tariff—to 
promote regime change during the Trujillo dictatorship.420 In addition to the case of 
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Chile, there are additional examples of human rights improvements as a result of U.S. 
sanctions—according to the Peterson Institute, 24 out of the 43 cases of U.S. sanctions 
with the goal of modest policy changes, were deemed successful. This indicates both that 
the goal was either somewhat or completely achieved and that sanctions contributed 
either modestly or decisively to this outcomes.421 
This is not to say, however, that U.S. economic sanctions are without negative 
consequences. Besides the obvious effect of forgone revenue to both countries, the most 
important, and perhaps most significant, consequence of U.S. sanctions on the Dominican 
Republic would be the worsening of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The 
Dominican government may accuse the U.S. of interfering in its domestic affairs and of 
bullying a small, developing country into trying to solve a situation overnight that the 
U.S. has not been able to address within its own borders. These accusations would be 
likely to diminish U.S. standing in the region. The U.S. must therefore evaluate the 
overall ramifications on bilateral relations that sanctions may carry. 
In sum, economic sanctions imposed on the Dominican Republic would promote 
greater adherence to human rights principles, namely the restoration of nationality to 
many Dominicans. It is an important economic tool the U.S. should consider in its quest 
to effect significant and positive change in the Dominican Republic. In fact, it is 
plausible, given economic conditions and current bilateral relations that U.S. sanctions on 
the Dominican Republic could succeed.  
The Role of the Caribbean Community 
 
The Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, is a regional organization composed 
of 15 Caribbean nations and dependencies established by Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana and 
Trinidad & Tobago in 1973 with the hope of achieving regional integration.422 Today, 
CARICOM enjoys a combined GDP of over $100 billion,423 a single market economy,424 
a common passport,425 and an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the 
European Union.426 Its major activities involve coordinating economic policies and 
development planning; devising and instituting special projects for the less-developed 
countries within its jurisdiction; operating as a regional single market for many of its 
members (CARICOM Single Market); and handling regional trade disputes.427  
Since its inception, other Caribbean nations have realized the economic and 
developmental benefits of CARICOM, evidenced by its expansion from the four original 
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signatories to the now 15 nations and dependencies that encompass it. The most recent 
full-fledged member is Haiti, which joined as a provisional member in July 1998 and 
attained full membership in 2002.428 The Dominican Republic has also sought 
membership in CARICOM several times. It became an “Observer of CARICOM” in 
1982 and almost ten years later, in 1991, presented CARICOM with a request for full 
membership.429 
The Dominican Republic made two additional requests for membership into the 
Caribbean bloc in 2005 and later in 2013. Each time the requests were met with 
ambivalence and fear that the larger Dominican economy with its higher productivity 
levels would threaten the trade and development of smaller and less developed 
CARICOM member-countries.430 Any hopes of joining the Caribbean Community, 
however, were shattered in November 2013 when the Constitutional Tribunal made its 
168-13 ruling. 
In response to the ruling, CARICOM convened a special meeting attended by the 
heads of government of Trinidad and Tobago (then chair of grouping), St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines (present chair), and Haiti, as well as CARICOM’s Secretary General.431 
At this meeting, the CARICOM leaders heard from members of civil society who 
denounced the measures and presented a Caribbean-wide petition condemning the 
decision.432 Among the points made during the discussions was that the Court’s ruling 
violated the Dominican Republic’s international human rights obligations. “It is 
especially repugnant that the ruling ignores the 2005 judgment made by the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights (IACHR) that the Dominican Republic adapt its 
immigration laws and practices in accordance with the provisions of the American 
Convention on Human Rights,” said Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Kamla Persad-
Bissessar, chairwoman of CARICOM.433 
At the conclusion of the meeting, the leaders declared in a joint statement that “it 
can no longer be business as usual” and suspended the Dominican Republic’s application 
to join calling on the country’s leaders to “take immediate, credible steps” to stave off a 
potential humanitarian crisis triggered by a citizenship ruling.434 The decision came with 
a formal condemnation of the Dominican Republic’s Constitutional Tribunal ruling 
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despite a last minute assurance by Dominican President Danilo Medina that those 
affected by the ruling would not be deported.435 
Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar said CARICOM “is prepared to engage the 
Dominican Republic, but the government of the Dominican Republic must be prepared to 
show good faith by immediate, credible steps as part of an overall plan to resolve this 
nationality and attendant issues in the shortest possible time.”436 
CARICOM also called on the government of the Dominican Republic to take the 
necessary political, legislative, judicial and administrative steps to urgently redress the 
grave humanitarian situation created by the ruling. CARICOM also called for 
international pressure to be brought to bear on the Dominican Republic and promised to 
“review its relationship with the Dominican Republic in other forums including that of 
CARIFORUM, CELAC and the OAS. It cannot be business as usual.”437 
On March 3, 2015 CARICOM reiterated its “grave concern” over the situation in 
the Dominican Republic through a statement following the 36th Annual Summit in the 
Bahamas where it condemned “the Dominican Republic government's repudiation of 
international law."438 CARICOM also condemned "the resurgence of anti-Haitian 
sentiment in the Dominican Republic” and concluded, “in view of these troubling 
developments, the Caribbean Community maintains its posture of 'no business as usual' 
with the Dominican Republic.”439 
In sum, CARICOM’s denunciation of the Dominican government, its call for 
improvements, and the statements’ clarity and forcefulness are commendable and have 
contributed to the ongoing repudiation of the Dominican Republic’s actions. Therefore, 
CARICOM should continue to apply pressure on the Dominican Republic through 
similar statements. However it must realize that there is a limit to what these statements 
can achieve. While suspension of the Dominican Republic’s application to join 
CARICOM is a worthwhile response, the Dominican government is unlikely to miss 
what it never had, certainly not enough to change domestic law and policy it believes to 
be right and within its jurisdiction and sovereignty. Until the Dominican Republic faces 
tough consequences to its decisions and actions it is not likely to change course. 
Therefore, CARICOM must follow on its promises and enlist the support of other 
regional blocs such as the OAS, CELAC, and CARIFORUM in denouncing the 
Dominican government’s actions and making it clear that there are consequences to its 
human rights grievances and disregard for international treaties and norms, including 
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expulsion and suspension of membership. The impact of this coordinated response is 
much more likely to be effective. 
The Role of the European Union 
 
The European Union (EU), like the U.S., is in a strong position to influence the 
course of migration and nationality law, and policy in the Dominican Republic because of 
its privileged relations with the country and the region. The EU cooperates with the 
Dominican Republic on both a bilateral and regional basis, the latter within the 
framework of the on-going EU-CELAC and EU-CARIFORUM talks.440 In addition, the 
EU promotes bilateral dialogue between the governments of the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti441 and has an economic agreement, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), 
with the Caribbean Forum (a grouping comprised of CARICOM-member states and the 
Dominican Republic known as CARIFORUM). The EPA, which helps make trade, 
investment, and development assistance easier for all parties, was signed and ratified in 
October 2008 and is an important example of the EU’s influential role in the 
Caribbean.442   
The EU, according to CARIFORUM’s former Secretary General, Ivan Ogando 
Lora, was and continues to be critical to the maintenance of cohesion between 
CARICOM and the Dominican Republic.  
 
“Throughout the years, the CARICOM-DR relationship has had its ups 
and downs but one significant characteristic is that the EU was always part 
of the background. Unfortunately, more often than not, the main incentive 
for the CARICOM-DR relation is linked to dealing with the EU as a single 
group. The fact that CARICOM-DR have been unable to work together vis 
a vis interlocutors other than the EU speaks for itself.”443 
 
Indeed it is hard to imagine a CARIFORUM without the EU taking center stage and 
ensuring that there is cooperation between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic. 
According to Ogando Lora it is “unlikely that CARIFORUM would survive without EDF 
[European Development Fund] support.”444 
Lastly, in November 2012 the member states of the EU and the Caribbean 
adopted a new Joint Caribbean-European Union Partnership Strategy to “enhance 
Caribbean– European Union relations and broaden the engagement by adding a political 
pillar to the traditionally development and trade cooperation based relationship with the 
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Caribbean region.”445 Thus, the EU can play a very important role to in the Caribbean in 
order to ensure that democratic development and rule of law continue to flourish.  
In February 2014, after the Constitutional Tribunal ruling, 168-13, the 
spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, issued a 
statement welcoming bilateral dialogue between the Dominican Republic and Haiti and 
extending its experience with issues including “trade and customs facilitation, security, 
fight against drug trafficking, border management, migration policies and environmental 
protection.”446 
The EU also welcomed the “commitment” stated by the Dominican Republic 
government to “take concrete measures to safe guard basic rights of persons of Haitian 
descent.”447 Lastly, the statement concluded that, while the EU recognizes “the sovereign 
right of the Dominican Republic to determine its policies on nationality and migration, 
the European Union encourages a rapid implementation of the necessary measures in line 
with universal human rights standards."448 
In addition to the official statement from the EU’s Foreign Affairs Office, 
individual states expressed their concerns with the Constitutional Tribunal ruling and 
subsequent developments in the Dominican Republic through the February 2014 
Working Group of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) conducted by the Human Rights 
Council, the global UN forum where States directly evaluate the human rights records of 
their peers. The recommendations ranged from urging the Dominican government to 
observe international covenants and treaties (Ireland and Germany)449 to ensuring that 
rights to nationality are applied fairly, with no discrimination, and not retroactively (Italy, 
Slovenia, and Spain).450 France took a more direct and unyielding route, stating it is 
important to: 
 
“Take all necessary measures to prevent statelessness and allow all 
residents to fully enjoy their fundamental rights in particular persons of 
Haitian’s descent who have been affected by the ruling of the 
Constitutional Tribunal of the 23rd of September 2013.”451 
 
These statements, as well as others, indicate that EU-member states not only 
understand the gravity of the situation in the Dominican Republic but also that enough 
political will exist to demand action and improvements to these human rights 
                                                 
445 Ibid. 
446 Catherine Ashton, "Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the 
Occasion of the 2nd High Level Binational Dialogue between Dominican Republic and Haiti," European 
Union External Action, February 4, 2014, accessed April 12, 2015, 
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deprivations. This is why the EU partnered with a local Dominican NGO to help improve 
implementation of the PNRE. 
 The EU provided €190,000 Euros (or 208,631 USD) to MENAMIRD to conduct a 
program to provide guidance and support to migrants under the PNRE.452 The program, 
which began on the first day of the regularization process and will run until the plan 
concludes, has the support of the General Directorate of Migration, the Ministry of 
Interior and Police, and the National Commission of Human Rights.453 
This project, aimed at people from rural and suburban communities in Santo 
Domingo, the bateyes and other towns like Boca Chica, Los Alcarrizos, Monte Plata, 
Barahona and San Pedro de Macoris, would identify, pay for, and directly accompany 
5,000 individuals who lack financial resources, according to William Charpantier, 
Coordinator for MENAMIRD.454 To achieve this, the project will hire about 105 
promoters to offer information and guidance to those who have not yet finalized the 
PNRE.455 
As explained earlier, the EU is a very important political actor in the Dominican 
Republic and the Caribbean. An actor whose influence has brought together the unlikely 
partnership of the Dominican Republic and CARICOM and now brings together 
governments in Santo Domingo and Port au Prince for “High level Binational Dialogue.” 
It is this very influence that the EU should use to pressure Santo Domingo into redressing 
its human rights violations; after all, several of its member states have expressed their 




Given the realities and human dimension of migration – past, present, and future – 
humanitarian solutions must be devised, implemented and adhered to, in order to protect 
the rights of migrants and their descendants in the Dominican Republic.  Although the 
Dominican Republic is tightening its borders, there is a continued and concerning inflow 
of migrants from Haiti. Migration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic has occurred for 
decades and the human outcome of such migration in the form of children as well as the 
continued desire of Haitians to cross the border will continue to be a pressing issue.  
With the application period for the Naturalization Law (169-14) expired, there 
needs to be a continued effort and process to restore Dominican nationality to those 
rendered stateless by Sentence 168-13.  This restoration of nationality is the sole 
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responsibility of the Dominican government.  Haiti has no part to play in providing 
documentation or assistance to Dominican nationals attempting to restore their 
nationality.  Moreover, the prospect of acquiring Haitian nationality is not an adequate or 
appropriate solution to address the effective statelessness produced by Sentence 168-13.  
Finally, the expulsion of Dominicans of Haitian descent to Haiti, whether incidentally or 
intentionally, would be unacceptable and only serve to further destabilize Haiti.  As such, 
the Dominican Republic should take every precaution to ensure that Dominican nationals 
are not expulsed to Haiti and that nationality to those left effectively stateless by Sentence 
168-13 is restored. 
With regards to the PNRE, the application deadline to apply for regularization is 
set to expire on June 17, 2015.  Once the deadline for the PNRE passes, irregular 
migrants will face official deportation, a threat that, as mentioned above, will also affect 
Dominicans of Haitian descent in both Groups A and B, as evidenced by recent cases.  
Unlike the restoration of nationality, the regularization of Haitian migrants in the 
Dominican Republic is a shared responsibility of both the Haitian and Dominican 
governments.  The two countries should continue to work together to ensure that all 
Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic have adequate documentation.  Moreover, 
the two countries will need to cooperate and maintain an open dialogue in administering 
legal deportations of irregular migrants from the Dominican Republic to Haiti.  
Consequently, the need for cooperation between the two countries in ensuring that human 
rights and humanitarian standards are upheld persists.   








Below please find a list of policy recommendations to various actors.  Recalling 
the difference between the regularization and the naturalization processes, as well as the 
difference between the migrant and the effectively stateless populations, when necessary, 
a distinction is made with regards to policy recommendations for migration issues versus 
statelessness issues.   
To the Dominican Republic 
 
Migration  Statelessness 
 
The Dominican Republic should empower and increase the capacity of the Human Rights 
Unit under the Attorney General’s Office so that it can effectively protect human rights 
within the country, particularly the rights of those most vulnerable. 
 
 
The Dominican Republic must ensure that 
legal deportations are carried out with strict 
adherence to international human rights 
law and humanitarian standards, which 
include maintaining an open dialogue with 
Haiti, as well as assistance to Haiti in 
receiving deportees. 
 
The Dominican Republic must protect the 
right to nationality and as such, re-establish 
a pathway to restore all the benefits of 
nationality and citizenship to Dominicans 




The Dominican Republic should expedite 
the restoration process for members of 
Group A, ensuring that citizenship 
documents are issued in a timely fashion. 
 
  
The Dominican Republic must safeguard 




The Dominican Republic should ratify the 










Migration  Statelessness 
 
Haiti should collaborate with the Organization of American States (OAS) to provide 
identification cards to Haitian citizens.  Such collaboration could help ensure a greater 




To Civil Society 
 
Migration  Statelessness 
 
Media outlets should continue to report on all issues regarding the regularization and 
naturalization processes in the Dominican Republic as well as the effects of these 
processes on the community. 
 
 
More pro bono legal services are needed to guide those pursuing documentation. The 
assistance of legal clinics conducted by law students studying in the Dominican Republic 
would be one option that provides invaluable legal assistance to applicants, professional 
experience to law students, and promotes a culture of pro bono service. 
 
 
To the Private Sector 
 
Migration  Statelessness 
 
Private sector employers should provide written labor contracts to workers, such that 
there is a documented record of employment. 
 
 
Private sector employers should provide requested documentation certifying employment 
to workers who are applying to the PNRE or similar processes. 
 
 
To the United States 
 
Migration  Statelessness 
 
The US should continue to fund the IOM. 
 






The US should consider placing economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic to 
improve its human rights record and address the issue of potential statelessness 
 
To the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
 
Migration  Statelessness 
 
CARICOM should continue to pressure the Dominican government via press statements 
and public appearances. It should enlist the support of other regional blocs such as the 
OAS, CELAC, and CARIFORUM in denouncing the Dominican government’s actions 
and make it clear that there are consequences to its human rights grievances and disregard 
for international treaties and norms, including expulsion and suspension of membership. 
 
  
To the European Union (EU) 
 
Migration  Statelessness 
 
The EU should be more vocal in its reproach of the Dominican citizenship and migration 
laws. It should also consider a joint effort with the U.S. government to make potential 
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Appendix 1: Abbreviations 
 
ABA ROLI – American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative   
 
ACHR – American Convention on Human Rights 
 
CAFTA-DR – Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
 
CARICOM – Caribbean Community 
 
CARIFORUM – Caribbean Forum 
 
CBSI – Caribbean Basin Security Initiative 
 
CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 
 
CEFASA –Centro de Formación y Acción Social y Agraria [in English: Center for 
Training and Social and Agrarian Action] 
 
CEJIL – Center for Justice and International Law  
 
CELAC – Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños [in English: 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States] 
 
CERD – International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
CERTV – Corporación Estatal de Radio y Televisión [in English: State Radio and 
Television Corporation] 
 
CMW – Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families  
 
CRC – United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
EPA – Economic Partnership Agreement  
 
EU – European Union 
 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
 
IACHR – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 




ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
ICJ – International Court of Justice 
 
IOM – International Organization for Migration 
 
JCE – Junta Central Electoral [in English: Central Electoral Board] 
 
MENAMIRD – Mesa Nacional para las Migraciones y Refugiados en República 
Dominicana  
 
MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
 
MOSCTHA –Movimiento Social-Cultural de los Trabajadores Haitianos [in English: 
The Socio-Cultural Movement for Haitian Workers] 
 
MUDHA – El Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitiana [in English: Movement of 
Dominican-Haitian Women] 
 
NGO – Non-governmental Organization 
 
OAS – Organization of American States 
 
OBMICA – Observatorio de Migrantes del Caribe [in English: Caribbean Migrants 
Observatory] 
 
PIDIH –Programme d’Identification et de Documentations aux Immigrants Haïtiens [in 
English: The Haitian Government’s Identification and Documentation Program for 
Haitian Immigrants] 
 
PLD – Dominican Liberation Party 
 
PNRE – Plan Nacional De Regularización De Extranjeros En Situación Migratoria 
Irregular [in English: National Plan to Regularize Foreigners in an Irregular Migratory 
Situation]  
 
PRD – Dominican Revolutionary Party 
 
PRS – Political Risk Services 
 
PRSC – Reformist Social Christian Party 
 
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
 




USD – United States Dollar  
 









































Letter from the Embassy of the Dominican Republic to The Paul H. Nitze School 










Appendix 3: Maps & Charts 





 Office Location Status on 
1/29/15457  
Documented problems458  
1 Santo Domingo Norte Open  
2 Santo Domingo Este Open  
3 Azua Open   
4 Bahoruco (Neyba) Not mentioned Not in operation (Oct.) 
5 Barahona 
 
Open Would not allow applicants to 
register without any 
documentation (Aug.) 
6 Dajabón Not mentioned Not in operation (Oct.) 
7 Duarte (San Francisco de 
Macorís) 
Open Did not accept residents of 
other regions (Oct.) 
8 Elías Piña (Comendador) Not mentioned Not yet opened (Oct.) 
                                                 
456 This map was created using Google MyMaps and the office locations as presented on the website of the 
Ministerio de Interior y Policia, available at 
http://mip.gob.do/CentrosdeAtenci%C3%B3nparaelPNRE/tabid/423/Default.aspx.  
457 Ministerio de Interior y Policia, “Oficinas de Regularización trabajarán este fin de semana.” 
458 As reported by Plataforma 169, however limited to Informe Nos. 6 and 7. 
112 
 
9 El Seibo Open Mother’s ID requested (Aug.) / 
See also Duarte (7) 
10 Espaillat (Moca) Not mentioned Not yet opened (Oct.) 
11 Hermanas Mirabal 
(Salcedo) 
Not mentioned Not yet opened (Oct.) 
12 Hato Mayor Open  
13 Independencia (Jimaní) Not mentioned Not in operation (Oct.) 
14 La Altagracia (Higüey) Open  
15 La Romana Open See also Barahona (5) / See 
also Duarte (7) 
16 La Vega Open Opened in September 
17 María Trinidad Sanchez 
(Nagua) 
Not mentioned Not yet opened (Oct.) 
18 Monseñor Nouel (Bonao) Not mentioned Not yet opened (Oct.) 
19 Monte Cristi Not mentioned Not yet opened (Oct.) 
20 Monte Plata Open Parents’ presence requested for 
applicants of legal age (Oct.) 
21 Samaná Open  
22 Sánchez Ramírez (Cotuí) Not mentioned  
23 San Cristóbal Open  
24 San José de Ocoa Not mentioned Not yet opened (Oct.) 
25 San Juan de la Maguana Open  
26 San Pedro de Macorís Open Mother’s ID requested (Aug.) / 
See also Duarte (7) 
27 Santiago Open Opened in September 
28 Santiago Rodríguez Not mentioned Not in operation because 
computer system not 
functioning (Aug.) 
29 Peravia (Bani) Open  
30 Pedernales Open Not in operation (Oct.) 
31 Puerto Plata Open Did not accept notarized 
documents (Oct.) 
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